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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, in that this Court has jurisdiction to review final orders and 
decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies. The 
Utah Labor Commission issued its final order in this case on October 21, 2004. 
(Record, p. 494).1 The Petitioner filed his Petition For Review on November 18, 
2004. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether substantial evidence existed for the Utah Labor 
Commission Appeals Board to conclude that Salt Lake County's proffered 
legitimate non-discriminatory justification for not advancing the Petitioner was 
non-pretextual and did not discriminate against the Petitioner based upon his 
national origin. 
A. Standard of review. The appellate court employs an 
intermediate standard of review to the agency's determination and to its 
application of law to the facts. Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial 
Commission, 958 P.2d 240, 242 (Ut. App. 1997). In doing so, it looks for an 
abuse of discretion in applying the law to the facts. ]d., P- 243. In applying that 
standard, the appellate court determines whether the agency decision exceeded 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. ]d. 
1
 All references to the record on appeal will be "Record, p. ". All references to the transcript 
included in the appeal will be "Transcript, ". 
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B. Preservation of issue. The Respondent raised this issue in 
its Motion For Review. (Record, p. 454-467). The Petitioner also raised this 
issue in his Response to Respondent's Motion For Review. (Record, p. 469-
481). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Section 17-33-1 U.C.A. (1953), as amended,2 requires certain counties, 
including Salt Lake County, to adopt merit systems under the County Personnel 
Management Act ("CPMA"). (Addendum C). "'Merit system1 means a system of 
personnel administration based on the principles set forth in Section 17-33-3." § 
17-33-2(7). Section 17-33-3 provides: 
"It is the policy of this state that each county may establish a personnel 
system administered in a manner that will provide for the effective 
implementation of the following merit principles: 
(1) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis 
of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills, including open 
consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment; 
(2) provision of equitable and adequate compensation; 
(3) training of employees as needed to assure high-quality 
performance; 
(4) retention of employees on the basis of the adequacy of their 
performance, and separation of employees whose inadequate 
performance cannot be corrected; 
(5) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of 
personnel administration without regard to race, color, religion, 
sex, national origin, political affiliation, age, or disability, and 
with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights as 
citizens; 
(6) provision of information to employees regarding their political 
rights and prohibited practices under the Hatch Act; and 
2
 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references shall be to U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
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(7) provision of a formal procedure for processing the appeals and 
grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion, 
restraint, or reprisal." 
The CPMA requires each county to appoint a three-member bipartisan 
career service council. §17-33-4. In addition, each county is required to create 
an office of personnel management administered by a director. §17-33-5. The 
director is required to recommend personnel rules for the county to adopt. The 
CPMA identifies the rules to be adopted in Section 17-33-5(3)(b): 
"(b) The rules shall provide for: 
(i) recruiting efforts to be planned and carried out in a manner 
that assures open competition, with special emphasis to be 
placed on recruiting efforts to attract minorities, women, 
persons with a disability as defined by and covered under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
12102, or other groups that are substantially 
underrepresented in the county work force to help assure 
they will be among the candidates from whom appointments 
are made; 
(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements 
wherever practical, that all successful candidates shall be 
required to meet in order to be eligible for consideration for 
appointment or promotion; 
(iii) selection procedures that include consideration of the 
relative merit of each applicant for employment, a job related 
method of determining the eligibility or ineligibility of each 
applicant, and a valid, reliable, and objective system of 
ranking eligible applicants according to their qualifications 
and merit; 
*** 
(ix) temporary, provisional, or other noncareer service 
appointments, which may not be used as a way of defeating 
the purpose of the career service and may not exceed 90 
days, with the period extendable for a period not to exceed 
an additional 90 days for good cause; 
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promotion and career ladder advancement of employees to 
higher level positions and assurance that all persons promoted 
are qualified for the position; 
*** 
(xiii) preparation, maintenance, and revision of a position 
classification plan for all positions in the career service, 
based upon similarity of duties performed and 
responsibilities assumed, so that the same qualifications 
may reasonably be required for, and the same schedule of 
pay be equitably applied to, all positions in the same class, 
the compensation plan, in order to maintain a high quality 
public work force, to take into account the responsibility and 
difficulty of the work, the comparative pay and benefits 
needed to compete in the labor market and to stay in proper 
alignment with other similar governmental units, and other 
factors; ..." 
Pursuant to the CPMA, Salt Lake County adopted a merit system and 
corresponding career ladder positions. Pertinent to this action are three policies 
found in the appellate record, Policy 5100 relating to "Employment Status" 
(Record, p. 523)(Addendum D), Policy 5200 relating to "Allocation And 
Classification of Merit Positions" (Record, p. 535)(Addendum E), and Policy 5400 
relating to "Pay Practices" (Record, p. 518)(Addendum F). 
Under Salt Lake County's merit system, employees do not necessarily 
"apply" for career ladder advancements. (Transcript, p. 161). Instead, it is the 
supervisor's responsibility to recognize that an inferior employee possesses the 
minimum qualifications for a career ladder advancement and automatically 
advance the employee accordingly, (id-)- However, an employee may also 
advance by applying for a new or vacated position, if a recruitment notice is 
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posted by Salt Lake County's Personnel Office and the employee qualifies and is 
selected for the position. (JdL, P- 158). 
Policy 5400, Part 4.0 provides that the minimum qualifications for county 
positions shall be set by the county's personnel division: 
"4.0 Minimum qualifications for County positions shall be set by the 
Personnel Division. 
4.01 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet the 
new minimum qualifications as established by personnel, 
and is not required to do so by law, he or she shall be 
grandfathered into the reclassified position. 
4.02 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet the 
New minimum qualifications and is required to do so by law, 
grandfathering shall be prohibited and the following 
procedures shall apply: 
4.2.1 Probationary employees will be terminated in good 
standing. 
4.2.2 Merit employees may be transferred, reassigned, or 
promoted to another position in accordance with 
Personnel Policy and Procedure: Pay Practices; OR 
4.2.3 The employee may be terminated in accordance with 
Personnel Policy and Procedure: Reduction-in-Force 
Separations." 
As more described below, under Background Facts, Salt Lake County's 
Personnel Division established minimum career ladder qualifications for all 
county engineers on April 1, 1980. (Record, p. 334, Petitioner's Exhibit 
3)(Addendum G). Significant to this action is the following provision: 
"The purpose of this memo is to outline procedures for applying with the 
State of Utah Department of Transportation to take the Engineer 
Qualifying Examination given every December. All County Engineers 
assigned to the grade 24, 26, 28 career ladder must pass the EQE or the 
EIT to be eligible for promotion to grade 26." 
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On March 16, 2000, the career ladder plan was changed in three Public 
Works divisions: Flood Control, Engineering and Planning/Development 
Services. (Record, p. 364, Petitioner's Exhibit 11)(Addendum H). The minimum 
qualifications for moving from an Engineer 26 to 28 within the career ladder were: 
" 1 . The employee has worked for one year as a grade 26. 
2. The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties the year as 
shown by receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory rating. 
3. The employee has received their Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) 
certification by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering."3 
The minimum qualifications for moving from an Engineer 28 to 30 within the 
career ladder were: 
1. The employee has worked for one year as a grade 28. 
2. The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year 
as shown by receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory 
rating. 
3. The employee has received their Professional Engineering (PE) 
License in the State of Utah." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case. This action arises under Utah's Anti-Discrimination 
Act, §34A-5-101 et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as amended. The Petitioner, an 
engineer, alleged that Respondent, Salt Lake County, failed to advance him from 
an entry level position in its career ladder system for over twenty-seven (27) 
years. Acknowledging that he did not have an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE, he claimed 
that other less qualified white, non-Arabic, non-Iranian/Persian engineers were 
advanced by the Respondent without having the same credentials he lacked. He 
3
 The Fundamentals of Engineering Examination described in the March 16, 2000, policy was a 
new examination and replaced the EQE and EIT Examinations required under the April 1, 1980, 
policy. (Transcript, p. 286 and 297). 
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claimed discrimination on the basis of national origin. He also claimed retaliation 
after he received a lesser evaluation following the filing of his charge.4 
Course of proceedings. The Petitioner filed a Charge Of Discrimination 
with the Utah Labor Commission on November 16, 1999. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8, 
Record, p. 356). An evidentiary hearing occurred on April 14, 2003, before 
Richard M. LaJeunesse, Administrative Law Judge, Utah Labor Commission. On 
October 9, 2003, ALJ LaJenunesse found in favor of the Petitioner and issued his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (Record, p. 411)(Addendum A). 
ALJ LaJenunesse found: 
"None of the six white males promoted from entry level engineers to 
higher grades over Mr. Tarkeshian obtained a PE license and/or 
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests as required by Salt 
Lake County's written policies. Salt Lake County argued exceptions 
applied for each promotion of the six white males who lacked a PE license 
and/or qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests. The 
preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed that the exceptions 
articulated by Salt Lake County in promoting white, non-Arabic, non-
Persian engineers served as pretexts to mask a subtle discrimination 
against Mr. Tarkeshian in violation of § 34A-5-106. It is incomprehensible 
that Mr. Tarkeshian who in many cases had more experience and 
education than those promoted over him sat in an entry level engineering 
position for 26 years while Salt Lake County found various and sundry 
exceptions to the written rules in order to promote white, non-arabic, non-
Iranian/Persian males. Salt Lake County always seemed able to find an 
exception to the rules that bound Mr. Tarkeshian to an entry level position 
in order to promote everyone but Mr. Tarkeshian." (Id., p. 420). 
ALJ La Jeunesse ordered Respondent Salt Lake County to immediately advance 
Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 26 engineer for a specified time period and to a grade 
4
 The Petitioner abandon's this claim on appeal in order to focus entirely on his main claim of 
discrimination. 
Tarkeshian Brief ***page 11 
28 engineer effective April 16, 2000. (Id., p. 422). He also ordered Respondent 
County to reimburse him in the form of backpay for the difference in pay he 
actually received from what he should have received. On October 30, 2003, ALJ 
La Jeunesse issued a Supplement Order awarding Mr. Tarkeshian attorney's 
fees and costs. (Record, p. 449). 
Disposition below. Salt Lake County filed a Motion For Review on 
November 6, 2003. (Record, p. 452). Nearly a year later, on October 21, 2004, 
the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board "substitute^] its judgment" for that of 
ALJ La Jeunesse, and dismissed the Plaintiffs action. (Record, p. 
494)(Addendum B). The Appeals Board found that the Petitioner had 
established his prima facie case of discrimination using the burden-shifting 
analysis imposed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
(id-, p. 498). Likewise, the Appeals Board found that the Respondent County 
fulfilled its burden of identifying an alleged non-discriminatory explanation of its 
treatment of the Petitioner. (Jd.). The Appeals Board then substituted its 
judgment for that of its own ALJ on the issue of pretext by concluding, "...the so-
called disparities in treatment are attributable to the other engineers meeting the 
County's requirements for advancement and other legitimate reasons that are not 
related to Mr. Tarkeshian's national origin." (id). 
The Petitioner filed his Petition For Review with this Court on November 
18,2004. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
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A. DESCRIPTION OF SALT LAKE COUNTY'S DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT. 
Salt Lake County's Public Works Department is made up of eleven 
separate payroll units, or divisions, who report to the Public Works Director. 
(Petitioner's Exhibit 12, Record, p. 365).5 Three of the eleven divisions employ 
engineers. They are Development Services, Public Works Engineering and 
Flood Control Engineering. (]d-)- Salt Lake County historically employs a total of 
approximately 14-15 FTE engineers in its Flood Control Division and 
approximately 8-12 FTE engineers in its other public works sectors. (Record, p. 
367). 
The organizational chart for Development Services is found at Record, p. 
554. This Subdivision is responsible for subdivision permits and urban 
hydrology.6 (Record, p. 554). During a significant portion of the past, the head of 
the Subdivision was Brent Tidwell. (\_d.). Some engineers in Development 
Services review plat plans, and subdivision plans in their review process and 
5
 The Petitioner has attempted to "marshal" all of the facts in fulfillment of his duty to marshal the 
facts on appeal. Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Div. of State, 842 P.2d 887 (1992). 
Accordingly, the Petitioner will bring out the Respondent's positions on factual issues, and 
relevant facts in support thereof, while reviewing all of the evidence submitted at the trial on the 
factual issues presented. 
6
 Development Services was developed by Salt Lake County in September, 1983. It was for the 
purpose of bringing together personnel who were involved in permits for development. Among 
others, licensed engineers in Flood Control who were reviewing private development projects 
were transferred to Development Services. This was done to better coordinate their 
responsibilities with others involved in development review and inspections for Salt Lake County. 
(R. 569,112). 
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therefore review some surveying work, but are not surveyors. (Transcript, p. 
128). 
The organizational chart for the Public Works Engineering and Flood 
Control Engineering is found at Record, p. 663. Engineers in the Public Works 
Engineering Division and the Flood Control Engineering Division are identified as 
being in the Engineering Division. (Record, p. 366). The Petitioner was 
employed in the Flood Control Engineering Division in design during the entire 
period of his employment. 
B. BACKGROUND FACTS. 
The Petitioner received a Bachelor Of Science in Civil Engineering from 
the University of Idaho in 1975. He previously received an Associates Degree in 
Engineering from Idaho State University in 1968 along with a Bachelor's degree 
in mathematics in the same year. (Transcript, p. 23-24, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 
Record, p. 337). He had also received a diploma in Industrial Drafting from the 
National Technical School of Los Angeles. From 1975 to 1976, he worked for 
Bush & Gudgell as an engineer's aid, and in 1976, worked for Call Engineering 
as a design draftsman, (id.)- In January, 1977, the Petitioner went to work for 
Salt Lake County's Surveyor's Office as a designer. 
In May, 1977, the Petitioner applied for and received an entry level grade 
24 engineer's position with Salt Lake County in its Public Works Department, 
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Flood Control Division.7 (]d.). He had nearly eight years of engineering related 
work prior to his employment with Salt Lake County. (Transcript, p. 26). 
In 1979, a grade 26 engineer position became open in Salt Lake County's 
Public Works, Flood Control Division, (id-, p. 27). The only requirement was that 
the applicant have a Bachelors of Science Degree in Engineering, (jd-)- After 
interviewing for the position, he was advised by Salt Lake County's Personnel 
Manager on November 23, 1979, that the County decided not to fill the position, 
(id-, P- 28, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Record, p. 343). Nevertheless, Salt Lake 
County filled the position "internally" with another person. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4, 
1J1, Record, p. 346). 
Four months later, on April 1, 1980, Salt Lake County's Personnel Division 
decided to issue a new policy regarding career ladder progression for its 
engineers. (Addendum G). The new policy required grade 24 engineers to take 
an Engineer Qualifying Examination ("EQE") or an Engineer In Training 
Examination ("EIT") in order to possess the minimum qualifications for 
advancement to grade 26. (]d.). 
Notwithstanding the new policy, Salt Lake County promoted Brent Tidwell 
from a grade 24 to a grade 27 who lacked the minimum qualifications of EQE or 
EIT. Mr. Tidwell also lacked an engineering degree and a PE (Professional 
Engineer) license. (Transcript, p. 32). In response, the Petitioner filed a 
7
 At that time, and until a reclassification in May, 2000, the classification career ladder for 
engineers was grades 24/26/28. In May, 2000, the engineering position was reclassified to 
grades 26/28/30. 
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grievance alleging unfairness. (]d.). The Director of the Public Work's 
Department answered the Petitioner's grievance on December 17, 1980, by 
stating that Mr. Tidwell "...was given 'Grandfather' status by the Personnel 
Department with full knowledge of career ladder requirements...." (Petitioner's 
Exhibit 4, Record, p. 346-347). The Petitioner appealed the Director's decision to 
the Salt Lake County Merit Council. A full hearing was held on February 5, 1981. 
On February 10, 1981, the Merit Council issued a decision that allowed the 
"Grandfathering" of Mr. Tidwell but concluded: 
"13. If and when said employee leaves the position, it must be filled by 
an engineer who is qualified according to the career ladder to possess not 
only the EIT certificate, or pass the EQE, but must also hold a 
Professional Engineer (PE) license." (Record, p. 349-351). 
C. SALT LAKE COUNTY'S 2000 RECLASSIFICATION SYSTEM. 
On March 16, 2000, Salt Lake County's Public Works Department 
"reclassified" its career ladder for engineers from a 24/26/28 grade ladder to a 
26/28/30 career ladder.8 (Record, p. 364, Transcript, 70, Addendum H). This 
classification was for all engineers employed by Public Works: Flood Control, 
Engineering and Development Services, (id.). 
Progression from grade 26 to grade 28 required being employed as a 
grade 26 engineer for one year, a satisfactory performance evaluation and the 
receipt of a FE Certificate (Fundamentals of Engineering Certificate by the 
Engineers employed In the grade 24 entry level were automatically advanced to the grade 26 
entry level. 
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National Council of Examiners for Engineering).9 Progression for a grade 28 to a 
grade 30 required being employed as a grade 28 for one year, a satisfactory 
performance evaluation and the receipt of their PE (Professional Engineering) 
License. (Id-)- Roy J. Arrigo, Classification and Compensation Manager for Salt 
Lake County testified at trial that the entry level for an engineer also required a 
bachelor's degree in civil engineering or four years of equivalent experience. 
(Transcript, p. 230). 
Mr. Arrigo testified as to the relationship between the 26, 28, and 30 
ladders. He testified there "really isn't" any difference in job duties between a 
grade 26 and grade 28 engineer. "[T]hey're all doing the same kind of work." 
(Transcript, p. 231). However, by having demonstrated proficiency by obtaining 
the FE, the employee's supervisor would probably spend less time supervising, 
(id-)- On the other hand, an engineer grade 30 is required to "sign off" on 
engineering documents and the PE is required. (Transcript, p. 232). 
D. CAREER LADDER PROMOTIONS FROM 1980-2000. 
After 1980, the Petitioner noticed that engineers, other than Mr. Tidwell 
who was grandfathered, were being promoted but lacked the minimum 
qualifications. As noted earlier, under Salt Lake County's merit system, an 
employee does not necessarily "apply" for advancement; instead, it is incumbent 
upon the employee's supervisor to recognize that an employee has the minimal 
9
 As noted in footnote 3 above, the FE replaced the EIT and EQE requirements. 
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qualifications for advancement and do it automatically by preparing an 
appropriate personnel action form. (Transcript, p. 161). 
In this case, the Petitioner was the only person in the Public Works 
Department that was never promoted for over 27 years and he remains to this 
day in his entry level position. (Transcript, p. 95). At the hearing before ALJ La 
Jeuness, the Petitioner identified seven specific white engineers who did not 
possess the minimum qualifications, and were less qualified than the Petitioner, 
yet, were advanced or promoted by Salt Lake County over the years. They are 
identified as follows: 
1. Brent Tidwell. Brent Tidwell did not hold an engineering 
degree. As mentioned above, the Merit Council issued a decision in 1981 that 
allowed the "grandfathering" of Mr. Tidwell but cautioned that his position would 
have to be filled by a qualified individual. He was the section manager of the 
Development Services Engineering Subsection.10 In March, 1985, Brent Tidwell 
was being promoted from grade 27 to grade 30 and Salt Lake County's Senior 
Personnel Analyst, Sharon Hoglund, questioned whether he should be the 
section manager as he lacked a surveyor's license and Section 58-22-1 required 
a registered surveyor to perform land surveying functions. Apparently, he was 
instructed to obtain a surveyor's license in 1979. (R. 568). He was allowed three 
more years to obtain a surveyor's license (R. 569) but was promoted to grade 28 
See footnote 6. 
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nevertheless on July 31, 1985, (R. 578).11 Therefore, at the time of his 
promotion, Mr.Tidwell lacked any of the required minimum qualifications of EQE, 
EIT, PE, or even a surveyor's license. On November 6, 1985, Mr. Tidwell 
obtained his land surveyor's license and was promoted to grade 30. (R. 575). 
Mr. Tidwell retired in early 1998. 
2. Reid Demman. Reid Demman did not hold an engineering 
degree. (Transcript, p. 77). He did hold, however, a four-year H.E.T. Certificate 
(Highway Engineering Technology) from the University of Utah/BYU. (R. 540). 
He did not have an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE. (R. 374, Transcript, p. 150). He had 
been employed in the Public Works Engineering as a survey technician 18, and 
worked below the Petitioner, until 1984 when he transferred to Development 
Services to be an engineering technician 19. (Transcript, p. 78 and Record, p. 
540). In 1991, he was awarded a grade 24 engineer position. (R. 540). 
Mr. Demman obtained a Land Surveyor's License on January 30, 
1998. (R. 577). On February 1, 1998, he was "promoted" to the position of 
Engineering Subdivision Section Manager, Development Services, at a grade 30. 
He did not complete an application. (R. 374). He did not have any prior 
managerial or supervisory experience. (Transcript, p. 222). He replaced Brent 
Tidwell who, as described above, retired in early 1998. (Transcript, p. 150). 
11
 It is interesting that, when Mr. Tidwell was approved for a grade 28 promotion, the Director of 
Development Services and the Associate Director of Public Works advised the Classification 
Selection Manager for the Administrative Services Department that "neither the surveyor's or 
engineer's license was required to perform the duties of this position." (R. 578). 
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Salt Lake County admitted that Mr. Demman lacked the necessary 
qualifications to fill Brent Tidwell's position as directed by the Salt Lake County 
Merit Council when it grandfathered Mr. TidwelL (R. 150). In response, Salt 
Lake County asserted the minimum qualifications were met by Mr. Demmen's 
Land Surveyor's License. (R. 151). 
According to the testimony of Roy J. Arrigo, Salt Lake County's 
Classification and Compensation Manager, some engineers in Development 
Services review land surveying functions in addition to their engineering 
functions. The reason is that Development Services often involves the review of 
plats and subdivision designs where right-of-ways and other surveying functions 
occur. (Transcript, p. 278). Therefore, according to Salt Lake County, having a 
land surveyor's license is more valuable to the Development Services 
Subdivision than an engineer's qualifications in some cases.12 (]d-)-
Roy J. Arrigo admitted in his testimony before ALJ La Jeunesse 
that the CPMA, Section 17-33-5(3)(b)(ii), as well as Salt Lake County's Policy 
5400, Part 4.0, required that Salt Lake County establish written minimum 
qualifications for positions. (Transcript, p. 125). He also admitted that Salt Lake 
County had not established any written policy to allow the substitution of the 
minimum requirements for EIT, EQE, FE, or PE, or an engineering degree, for 
that of a Land Supervisor's License. (Transcript, p. 146). Mr. Arrigo was forced 
12
 Notwithstanding this testimony, its should be noted that Salt Lake County has an official 
surveyor, as permitted by statute, who employs licensed surveyors who perform surveying 
functions. 
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to admit that Salt Lake County's Personnel Director should have established a 
"different set of career ladder criteria" to allow for the substitution of a land 
surveyor's license, but failed to do so. (Transcript, p. 153). 
3. Steven Dale. Steven Dale did not hold an engineering 
degree. Salt Lake County recruited, through a recruitment notice, the position of 
Engineer 24/26 position in Development Services on or about February 13, 1998. 
(R. 633). The announcement for a grade 26 required a bachelor's degree in 
engineering, EIT, EQE, or a Professional Land Surveyor's license. Steven Dale 
was hired 4/27/98 at grade 26.13 (R. p. 632). At the time of his appointment, he 
lacked any of these qualifications except a Land Surveyor's License.14 
(Transcript, p. 198-198). 
4. Denton Mecham. Mr. Mecham did not hold an engineering 
degree. (Transcript, p. 167). He did not have an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE. (Record, 
p. 374, Transcript, p. 162). He was initially employed in the Operations Division 
of Public Works as a grade 24/26 engineer. (Record, p. 612, 612a, and p. 393). 
He was promoted from an engineer 24 to engineer 26 on January 1, 1999. 
(Record, p. 394). On January 1, 1999, he was "promoted" to a pavement 
Interestingly, the Public Works Department submitted a "Position Description Form" on 1/23/98 
that identified Steven Dale as the employee of this position even though the job had not been 
posted. (Record, p. 408, Exhibit 22). 
14
 Roy J. Arrigo, Classification and Compensation Manager for Salt Lake County, testified that he 
did not know the difference between a professional land surveyor or a professional engineer but a 
land surveyor is generally paid less in the marketplace. (R. 199). 
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manager supervisor as a grade 26. (Record, 394). (Transcript, p. 90, 162). He 
was not required to apply for the position. (Record, p. 374).15 
Salt Lake County attempted to justify Mr. Mecham's position and 
grade on the basis that he was in a supervisory position. (Transcript, p. 165). 
According to Mr. Arrigo, the actual duties of a supervisor do not require the 
minimum qualifications.16 (Transcript, p. 165-167). However, when asked if 
there was any policy, rule or regulation that stated supervisors did not have to 
meet the minimum qualifications for the position, Roy J. Arrigo, Classification and 
Compensation Manager for Salt Lake County testified, "There's no such rule." 
(Transcript, p. 166). 
5. Rick Olson. Mr. Olson hefd no engineering degree. He did 
hold a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration from the University of 
Phoenix and an Associates Degree in Drafting from the Utah Technical College. 
(Record, p. 614). He did not hold an EIT, EQE, FE, or PE. (Transcript, p. 168 
and Record, p. 374). He started with the Public Works Department in 1979 as a 
designer. On March 16, 1980, he became an Engineer 24 in Flood Control of 
Public Works. (Record, p. 614). On December 1, 1987, Salt Lake County 
15
 On December 16, 1999, he applied for and was promoted to the position of Sanitation Director 
of the Public Works Department, grade 33. (Record, p. 599). 
16
 Notwithstanding his testimony, Mr. Mecham's duties as pavement manager supervisor clearly 
required engineering functions. See his job description, Record, p. 608-611. He was responsible 
for, among other things, "project design and organization of all field data", "engineer estimate and 
awarding of contract[s]", development of engineer estimates for highway and maintenance needs, 
"train engineering interns and technicians to conduct field surveys", and others. His job 
description specifically required, under the "Knowledge" Section, "Engineering principles and 
applications for highway design." 
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promoted Mr. Olsen from a grade 24 engineer to a grade 26 Permit Supervisor in 
the Highway Department. On January 1, 1999, he was promoted as part of a 
"reclassification" to Flood Control Supervisor, Grade 28. (Record, p. 616). He 
was not required to apply for the position. (Record, p. 374). 
6. Larry Taggart. Larry Taggart did not hold an engineering 
degree. Mr. Taggart worked with the Petitioner in the position of a grade 24 
engineer in the Flood Control Engineering Division in design. (Record, p. 642). 
On December 31, 1998, Mr. Taggart retired after 27 years as an engineer 24. 
(Record, p. 640). On August 4,1999, Salt Lake County rehired Mr. Taggart in 
the same position as a "temporary" employee but rehired him as a grade 26. 
(Record, p. 641). Neil Stack, Salt Lake County's Engineering Director, frankly 
testified that they made him a grade 26 "to come back." (Transcript, p. 291). 
Although Mr. Taggart is classified as a "temporary" employee, he remains 
employed to this day. (Transcript, p. 133-134, 178). 
Salt Lake County admitted that Mr. Taggart did not have the 
qualifications to be in an engineer grade 26. (Transcript, p. 188). Roy J. Arrigo, 
Classification and Compensation Manager for Salt Lake County, testified that 
Salt Lake County considered Mr. Taggart's qualifications as "immaterial" 
(Record, p. 188) because, according to Salt Lake County, there are no minimum 
qualifications for temporary employees. (Record, p. 185). He claimed that this 
was an "interpretation" of the County Personnel Management Act. (Record, p. 
186). Yet, the CPMA, Section 17-33-5(3)(b)(ix) provides, "temporary, provisional, 
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or other non-career service appointments, ... may not be used as a way of 
defeating the purpose of the career service and may not exceed 90 days...." On 
cross-examination, Mr. Arrigo admitted that Salt Lake County had no express 
written policy that exempted temporary employment from meeting the minimum 
qualifications for the job.17 (Transcript, p. 186). 
7. Martin Knaphus. Martin Knaphus did not hold an 
engineering degree. Mr. Knaphus was employed in the Public Works Flood 
Control Division along with the Petitioner in a grade 21 position. In the fall of 
1991, Development Services Engineering Subdivision reclassified the position of 
Highway Engineering Technician 23 to an Engineer 24-26. (Record, p. 591). Mr. 
Knaphus successfully applied for the position and was transferred from Public 
Works Flood Control to Development Services effective May 1, 1992, and 
became an Engineer 24. (Record, p. 586). Mr. Kanaphus did not have the EIT, 
EQE, FE, or PE. (Transcript, p. 155). Like Steven Dale, however, he acquired a 
Land Surveyor's License on January 25, 2000. (Record, p. 584). Like Steven 
Dale, Salt Lake County then promoted Mr. Kanaphus to a Grade 26 Engineer 
effective February 1, 2000, (Record, p. 583, Transcript, p. 156). Salt Lake 
County again "reclassified" his position to an Engineer Review Specialist 
Salt Lake County, however, requires all "provisional" appointments to meet the minimum 
qualifications for the position. (Policy 5100, § 5.2.4). Mr. Arrigo could not explain why provisional 
employees would have to meet minimum requirements but temporary employees would not. 
(Transcript, p. 267). 
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effective April 16, 2000, and promoted him to a grade 28. (Record, p. 581, 
Transcript, p. 156). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner argues that he was the victim of discrimination on the basis 
of national origin, or race, when Salt Lake County Public Work's Department 
failed to advance him from an entry level engineer position for over 27 years 
while, at the same time, advancing less qualified white non-Iranian/Persian 
employees. He submits that Salt Lake County's Public Works Department found 
ways to manipulate and evade Salt Lake County's career ladder program to 
avoid the mandatory minimum qualifications for advancement. 
No dispute exists relative to the Petitioner's prima facie case of 
discrimination. Instead, the only issue in this case is whether there was 
substantial evidence in the record for the Labor Commission Appeal Board to 
overrule its own Administrative Law Judge and conclude that Salt Lake County's 
articulated reason for not promoting the Petitioner past an entry-level position for 
over 27 years, while at the same time advancing white non-Iranian/Persian 
males, was not pretextual and was based upon legitimate and lawful non-
discriminatory reasons unrelated to the Petitioner's origin. 
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the Appeals Board erred in its 
analysis by ignoring the legal standard regarding pretext and ignoring or 
marginalizing undisputed evidence of "disturbing" irregularities conducted by Salt 
Lake County's Public Works Department in its promotional processes. These 
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disturbing irregularities were not technical in nature and were abundant within the 
Public Works Department. The discriminatory effect was to leave Mr. Tarkeshian 
in his entry level position for his entire career. 
The Petitioner seeks a reversal of the Labor Commission Appeals Board 
and the reinstatement of the decision of its own Administrative Law Judge that 
originally found in Petitioner's favor. He also seeks an award of a reasonable 
attorney's fee and costs for this Appeal if he is successful. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
THE LABOR COMMISSION APPEALS BOARD ERRED WHEN IT 
CONCLUDED THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY'S PROFFERED LEGITIMATE 
NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASON FOR NOT ADVANCING THE PETITIONER 
WAS NON-PRETEXTUAL AND DID NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THE 
PETITIONER BASED UPON HIS NATIONAL ORIGIN. 
A. INTRODUCTION AND ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES ON 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
By its own words, the Utah Labor Commission "substitute^] its own 
judgment" for that of its own administrative law judge. (Record, p. 494, 495). 
The only difference between the Appeals Board and its ALJ is that the former 
disagreed with the ultimate legal conclusion regarding pretext, i.e., whether Salt 
Lake County 's failure to promote the Petitioner for over 27 years, while, at the 
same time, promoting seven other less qualified white male employees was non-
pretextual and non-discriminatory. (Id-, P- 498). In other words, the Appeals 
Board completely condoned or discounted the "so-called disparities in 
treatment..." proved by the Petitioner at trial, (jd.)-
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The Petitioner admits that an agency may "substitute its own judgment" for 
that of its ALJ, United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 
807, 811 (Utah 1980), and may affirm, modify, or reverse its decision, or remand 
for further proceedings. §34A-1 -303(4). However, an agency's ability to 
substitute its own ALJ's judgment is not without limits. For example, an agency's 
ultimate findings must be supported by substantial evidence, id-, p. 811. 
"Substantial evidence" is '"that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is 
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Harken v. 
Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted). 
In supplying the substantial evidence test, the appellate court reviews both 
evidence that supports the Board's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from 
them. Albertson's v. Department of Employment Sec, 854 P.2d 570, 574 (Ut. 
App. 1993). Further, the ultimate findings must be viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court. Albertson's, supra, p. 574-575. Lastly, because the Utah 
Legislature has not given the Labor Commission authority to interpret Utah's 
Anti-Discrimination Act, this Court reviews the Labor Commissions rulings of law 
for correctness. Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993, 995 (Ut. App. 
2001). 
This case is one of alleged discrimination arising under Utah's Anti-
Discrimination Act, §34A-5-106 that prohibits discrimination on the basis of, 
among other things, race and national origin. Both the ALJ and the Appeals 
Board attempted to follow the precedents established by federal courts in 
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interpreting and applying federal anti-discrimination laws. (Order Granting 
Motion For Review, Record, p. 497). Generally, so do Utah's appellate courts. 
For example, see Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, supra, p. 995. 
The application of the burden-shifting analysis set forth by McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) is a question of law. Sheikh v. 
Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d 1103 (Ut. App. 1995); and, Handy v. 
Union Pac. R.R.. 841 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App.1992). When reviewing an 
agency's conclusion regarding a question of law, appellate courts accord the 
agency decision no deference, but review it for correctness. Sheikh v. 
Department of Public Safety, supra; Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm'n, 811 
P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991); Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n. 897 P.2d 352, 354 
(Utah App.1995). 
Here, both the ALJ and the Appeals Board followed the "burden-shifting" 
analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Under the burden-shifting 
analysis, a party claiming discrimination first has the burden of demonstrating a 
prima-facie case. Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety, supra, p. 1106. 
Second, once completed, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a 
non-discriminatory reason for its suspect actions, (id.). Third, if the employer 
does so, then the burden re-shifts to the complainant to demonstrate that the 
employer's alleged non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. (id.)- The ultimate 
burden of persuasion that the employer discriminated against the employee " 
'remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" University of Utah v. Industrial 
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Commission, 736 P.2d 630, 635 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine. 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 LEd.2d 207 (1981). 
Here, again, both the ALJ and the Appeals Court concluded that the 
Petitioner presented a prima facie case. (Order Granting Motion For Review, 
Record, p. 498). They both agreed that Salt Lake County offered an explanation 
for its suspect actions, (jd-)- However, the ALJ and the Appeals Court differed 
on the third analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: whether the 
Respondent's explanation for its actions were pretextual. 
For the reason's set forth below, the Petitioner alleges the Labor 
Commission Appeal Board's ultimate factual and legal conclusion, that Salt Lake 
County's explanation for not promoting the Petitioner was not pretextual, is not 
supported by substantial evidence taking the record as a whole and applying the 
correct standard of law regarding pretext. Albertson's v. Department of 
Employment Sec, supra. It wrongfully substituted its judgment for that of its own 
ALJ. 
The Petitioner respectfully submits that, under the law governing pre-text 
in the federal system, to be applied in the instant case, there is only one 
conclusion: that Salt Lake County's alleged exceptions to the law and 
irregularities regarding promotions allowed a subtle form of discrimination to 
occur that left the Petitioner in an entry level position for his entire employment 
with Salt Lake County. 
B. LEGAL STANDARD TO BE APPLIED REGARDING PRETEXT. 
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The Petitioner respectfully maintains that the Labor Commission Appeals 
Board employed the wrong legal standard in determining pretext. This Court has 
not addressed how an employee may demonstrate pretext, or what evidence 
may be considered. However, other courts have done so while addressing 
federal anti-discrimination laws and this Court often follows such decisions. 
Victron/Lika, supra. 
The law in the Tenth Circuit is well settled that an employee may show 
pretext by "'prior treatment of plaintiff; the employer's policy and practice 
regarding minority employment (including statistical data); disturbing procedural 
irregularities (e.g. falsifying or manipulating...criteria; and the use of subjective 
criteria.'" Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 305 F.3d 1210, 1218, 89 Fair 
Empl.Prac.Case (BNA) 1675, 83 Empl. Prac.Dec. P41.291 (10th Cir. 
2002)(citations omitted).18 Pretext need not be shown by direct evidence (racist 
comments, ageist drawings or the like) and may be demonstrated by 
circumstantial evidence alone. (]d, ft. 5, p. 1218). As the Court noted in Garrett, 
supra, p. 1218, ft. 5, "Indeed, the burden-shifting structure, involving prong three, 
pretext, is precisely the means by which a plaintiff may prove discrimination with 
circumstantial rather than direct evidence." 
Citing specific cases, the Garrett court explained at p. 1218 that, "Courts view with 
skepticism subjective evaluation methods...." (Citation omitted). "[Subjective promotion 
procedures are to be closely scrutinized because of their susceptibility to discriminatory abuse." 
(Citation omitted). 
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In Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401, 30 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 
(BNA) 13115 (10th Cir. 1983), a case arising from Utah involving the promotion of 
a engineer, the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court decision following a bench 
trial and held that an inference of pretext existed sufficient to rebut the 
employer's alleged non-discriminatory explanation for its suspect action where 
the employer had "serious procedural irregularities" in its promotional processes. 
In Mohammed, the procedural irregularity was the employer's failure to convene 
an ad hoc committee to interview applicants and the decision to promote was 
based upon the mere review of personnel files. 
In Muller v. United States Steel Corporation, 509 F.2d 923, 10 Fair 
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 323, 9 Empl.Prac.Dec. p. 9901 (10th Cir. 1975), involving 
another Utah promotion case, the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's decision 
following a bench trial and ruled that statistics could be used to demonstrate 
pretext. In Muller, the plaintiff showed that, though employed for fourteen years, 
he had not been chosen to be a spell foreman, a criterion used to become a turn 
foreman. The Muller Court also ruled that the application of "vague and 
inconclusive criteria" and the lack of "meaningful standards" in promotion 
decisions supported pretext. Muller, supra, p. 927. The Muller Court specifically 
rejected the employer's argument that a specific intent to discriminate had to 
exist: 
"The law is clear that a plaintiff in a job discrimination case need not 
prove that the employer had a specific intent to discriminate. It is sufficient 
that the employer's conduct produced discriminatory results." (id.)-
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In DoDoo v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 235 F.3d 522, 84 Fair 
Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 933, 79 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,357, 2001 CJ CAR. 184 
(10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit upheld a jury trial and jury instructions 
involving a failure to promote. In DoDoo, the plaintiff showed prextext by a 
"highly irregular" procedure where the employer promoted a non-minority ahead 
of the plaintiff in violation of the company's rule that one must be employed for at 
least a year before being considered for promotion. 
The Tenth Circuit has likewise reversed district court decisions following 
summary judgment in favor of the employer where the employee demonstrated 
pretext by irregular procedures in the promotion process. In Doebele v. 
Sprint/United Management Co., 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit 
reversed a Kansas District Court's ruling on pretext where the employee showed 
the employer's decision not to promote, and ultimately terminate the plaintiff, was 
shown to be documented by the employer "after the fact" to justify decisions 
already made by the employer. Likewise, in Beaird v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 
145 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1998), the Tenth Circuit reversed an Oklahoma district 
court's ruling on pretext where the employee demonstrated the employer used 
"potential" as a criteria for promotion in violation of its own policies. 
In the present case, the Appeals Board did not employ the legal standards 
as expressed by the above decisions in deciding the issue of pretext. In fact, the 
Appeals Board did not discuss it at all. Instead, the Appeals Board wanted what 
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is not required to prove pretext, i.e., evidence of direct discrimination.19 Garrett, 
supra, p. 1218. Moreover, it condoned and marginalized the Plaintiffs 
undisputed evidence of these serious promotional irregularities by simply stating 
that the "County could have done a better job of conforming its written policies to 
its actual practices...." (Record, p. 498). And contrary to the Appeals Board's 
strange conclusion regarding the nationality of his co-workers20, it was 
undisputed at the hearing before ALJ La Jeunesse that all of the employees 
discussed in relation to this case were all white, non-minorities, except the 
Petitioner who was of Persian/Iranian origin, as Judge La Jeunesse noted. 
(Record, p. 420). 
C. APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD REGARDING 
PRETEXT TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The Petitioner's evidence on pretext is amply supported by the record. In 
summary this evidence consisted of the following: 
A. The Petitioner, of Persian/Iranian national origin, has 
remained in an entry level position for over twenty-seven years without 
promotion. 
B. He is the only person in his department who has not been 
promoted. 
The Appeals Board stated in its ruling, "He has identified no instances during that time [twenty-
five years of employment] any conflict or comment from co-worker, supervisor or manager related 
to his national origin." (Record, p. 498)(Explanation added). 
20
 The Appeals Board stated in its ruling, "Furthermore, Mr. Tarkeshian has presented no 
evidence regarding the national origin of his co-workers and supervisors." (Record, p. 498). 
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C. During the same period of time, seven less qualified white, 
non-minority, employees were promoted in the Public Works Department through 
admitted irregularities, if not outright violations of the law. 
The first two facts were not disputed below and are unlikely to be disputed 
on appeal. Therefore, the Petitioner will focus the balance of his argument on 
the irregularities or the "exceptions to the rule" claimed by Salt Lake County in 
justifying the promotion of these seven employees to the exclusion of the 
Petitioner. This is important because ALJ La Jeunesse viewed "the exceptions 
articulated by Salt Lake County in promoting white, non-Arabic, non-Peersian 
engineers "...as pretexts to mask a subtle discrimination against Mr. 
Tarkeshian..." (Record, p. 420), whereas the Appeals Board condoned or 
marginalized Salt Lake County's violations of its own career ladder rules as being 
both reasonable and non-discriminatory. (Record, p. 498-499). 
First, the irregularities that permeated Salt Lake County's career-ladder 
promotional processes must be classified as "disturbing" or "highly" irregular and 
not mere technicalities. Garrett, supra. The undisputed facts in this case rise to 
that level. Here, Utah State Law mandates that counties, including Salt Lake 
County, establish the minimum qualifications "for appointment or promotion." 
CPMA, § 17-33-5(3)(b)(ii). In addition, Salt Lake County's own policy, Policy 
5400, Part 4.0, requires that the minimum qualifications be set forth in writing. In 
conformity with the above statute and policy, Salt Lake County established 
minimum qualifications for career-ladder appointments and promotions of all 
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engineers by the publication of its April 1, 1980, Policy (Addendum G) and its 
March 16, 2000, Policy (Addendum H) that required either the EIT, or EQE, or 
FE, to advance from an entry level position. These policies did not allow Salt 
Lake County's Public Works Department to substitute any of these minimum 
qualifications for a Land Surveyor's License. 
Yet, the Public Works Department allowed all seven white employees to 
be advanced, at one time or another, on the basis they held a surveyor's license, 
even thought they had never held an engineering degree and had never taken 
the EQE, EIT, or FE. All seven appointments violated the County's own written 
policies as well as Utah State Law. 
Salt Lake County also attempted to defend the promotions of the seven 
white employees on the basis that some became supervisors. Salt Lake County 
alleged that its supervisors really did not need to meet the minimum 
qualifications. It takes "Chutzpa" for Salt Lake County to advocate that its 
supervisory engineers did not need to meet the minimum qualifications in order 
to supervise those who perform the actual engineering services! How in the 
world can they possibly be effective supervisors if they do not have the basic 
engineering knowledge required of their subordinates? Moreover, as admitted by 
Mr. Arrigo, there is no provision in Salt Lake County's written policies and 
procedures that suggest an engineer may be promoted or advanced to a 
supervisory position without the minimum qualifications. 
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Salt Lake County also attempted to justify its failure to follow its own 
written policies regarding promotion, regarding one of the seven white 
employees, Mr. Taggart, on the basis his was only a "temporary" appointment 
and that temporary appointments did not need to meet the minimum 
qualifications required for that position. As the court may recall, Mr. Taggart 
worked side-by-side with the Petitioner as an engineer 24 until December 31, 
1998, when Mr. Taggart retired. (Record, p. 640). Shortly thereafter, Salt Lake 
County rehired Mr. Taggart in the same position as a "temporary" employee but 
rehired him in a grade 26. (Record, p. 641). Although Mr. Taggart is classified 
as a "temporary" employee, he remains employed to this day. (Transcript, p. 
133-134, 178). 
In response, the Petitioner demonstrated below that under State law, 
CPMA, § 17-33-5(3)(ix), "temporary, provisional, or other non-career service 
appointments"..."may not be used as a way of defeating the purpose of career 
service and may not exceed 90 days...." At trial before ALJ La Jeunesse, Mr. 
Arrigo was forced to admit that Salt Lake County had no express written policy 
that exempted temporary employment from meeting the minimum qualifications 
for the job. (Transcript, p. 186). 
Second, Salt Lake County's "so-called" exceptions to Utah State Law and 
its own written policies only benefited less qualified, white, non-Iranian/Persian, 
employees. As found by ALJ La Jeunesse, 
"It is incomprehensible that Mr. Tarkeshian who in many cases had more 
Tarkeshian Brief ***page 36 
experience and education than those promoted over him sat in an entry 
level engineering position for 26 years while Salt Lake County found ' 
various and sundry exceptions to written rules in order to promote white, 
non-Iranian/Persian males. Salt Lake County always seemed able to find 
an exception to the rules that bound Mr. Tarkeshian to an entry level 
position in order to promote everyone but Mr. Tarkeshian." (Record, p. 
420). 
The Petitioner respectfully maintains that the undisputed evidence in this 
case demonstrates that Salt Lake County's articulated alleged non-discriminatory 
reason for not advancing the Petitioner, while advancing the other white 
employees, was pure pretext. Garrett, supra. There is no substantial evidence 
to sustain the Labor Commission Appeal Board's conclusion that the promotion 
of these seven employees, leaving the Petitioner in an entry level position for 
over 27 years, was based upon legitimate non-discriminatory reasons. Frankly, it 
is inconceivable that the Appeals Board could condone violations of the County 
Personnel Management Act, as well as Salt Lake County's own merit system, 
that were passed to advance merit principles and prohibit the very thing that 
occurred in this case. Salt Lake County's Public Works Department used, or 
abused, Salt Lake County's career-ladder system to exclude the Petitioner from 
promotions. When it comes to prextext in the promotional process, "It is 
sufficient that the employer's conduct produced discriminatory results." Mullen 
supra, p. 927. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Petitioner respectfully urges the Court to reverse the decision of the 
Labor Commission Appeals Board and to reinstate the decision of its ALJ La 
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Jeunesse. The Petitioner also respectfully urges the Court to award the 
Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee and costs to be determined appropriately 
on remand. 
Dated this 3tK day of January, 2005. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
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Valerie M. Wilde 
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2001 South State Street, Suite 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Alan Hennebold, USB # 4740 
Utah Labor Commission 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the 
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail 
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STEPHEN W. COOK 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Case No. 8000083 
FINDINGS OF FACT „ 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
ORDER 
Judge: Richard eimesse 
HEARING: Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on April 14, 2003 at 8:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and 




 friend J junesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES i The petitioner, Mostafa (Jim) Tarkeshian, was present and represented by 
his attorney Ashley Jolly. 
Tht
~* r espondent ^ j !. ';i:.^.jiiU'' ' .- * J^ V^I-J;-
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Jim Tarkeshian, filed an "Charge of Discrimination" with the Utah 
Antidiscrimination and Labor Division (UALD) on November 16, 1999 and claimed that Salt 
Lake County Public Works (Salt Lake County) discriminated against him in Violation of Utah 
Code § 34A-5-106. Mr. Tarkeshian asserted that Salt Lake County failed to promote him in his 
employment as a civil engineer because of his race, Arabic, his national origin, Iranian/Persian, 
his color, brown, and his age, over forty. At the hearing, Mr. Tarkeshian also claimed that Salt 
Lake County retaliated against him because he filed the "Charge of Discrimination." Salt Lake 
County generally denied the allegations of discriminatory conduct. 
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II. ISSUES. 
1. Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian i - i v.*.iw>; «^  .-. .-iigiiieer 
because of his national origin, Iranian/Persian? 
2 Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian in his position as a civil engineer 
because of his race, Arabic? 
Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian in his position as a civil engineer 
because of his color, brown? 
4. Did Salt Lake County fail to proi; :-' \u^,,sh'in , \^\\\ * ru^oieer 
because of his age over forty? 
Did Salt Lake County fail to promote Jim Tarkeshian in his position as a civil engineer in 
retaliation for his filing of a Charge of Discrimination? 
HI. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
The petitioner, Jim Tarkeshian, filed an "Charge of Discrimination" with the Utah 
Antidiscrimination and Labor Division on November 16, 1999. On November 14, 2001 UALD 
issued a Determination and Order and found no cause to support Mr. Tarkeshian's claim. On 
December 14, 2001 Mr. Tarkeshian filed a Notice of Appeal and Request for Formal Evidentiary 
Hearing with respect to UALD's Determination and Order. 
On August 22, 2002 Salt Lake County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which claimed a 
right to judgment as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts in this case. Mr. Tarkeshian 
filed a Memorandum in Opposition of Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 2, 2002 I 
issued a Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgement wherein I denied the motion. I held a de 
novo evidentiary hearing in this matter on April 14, 2003. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Mr. I arkesliian began his employment with Salt Lake County as a grade 24 engineer on January 
18, 1977. Mr. Tarkeshian born on September 23, 1940, was 36 years old when hired by Salt 
Lake County. Mr. Tarkeshian worked for Salt Lake County as a civil engineer for over twenty-
six years from 1977, through the date of the hearing. In the twenty-six plus years he worked as 
an engineer, Salt Lake County never promoted Mr. Tarkeshian beyond the entrance level for 
engineers. 
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Salt Lake County asserted that engineers operated under a "career ladder" system of promotion 
where after one year service Salt Lake County promoted engineers to the next grade based on the 
engineer's passing the EIT1, EQE2, FE\ or proof of a PE4 license. Salt Lake County refused to 
promote Mr. Tarkeshian because he failed to pass either the EIT, EQE, or FE, and never obtained 
a PE license. 
Mr. 1 arkeshian obtamed Bachelor of Science degrees in both Civil Engineering and Mathematics 
from the University of Idaho. [Exhibit "P-l"]. Mr. Tarkeshian also obtained a diploma in 
Industrial Drafting from National Technical Schools of Los Angeles, California, [id.]. 
In 1979 Mr. Tarkeshian applied for a position as an engineer grade 26 in the Salt Lake County 
Flood Control Division. [Exhibit "P-2"]. Mr. Tarkeshian did not obtain the grade 26 position 
with Flood Control, [id.]. In a letter to Mr. Tarkeshian dated November 23, 1979, Salt Lake 
County told him that the county elected not to fill the position, [id.]. Salt Lake County did 
actually fill the grade 26 position with an internal promotion, [see: Exhibit "P-4"]. 
On October 31, 1980 Mr. Tarkeshian filed a grievance based on Salt Lake County's failure to 
promote him to the grade 26 position. [Exhibit "P-4" and Exhibit "P-5"]. On December 16, 1980 
Donald Spencer, the Director of Salt Lake County Public Works, held a hearing on Mr. 
Tarkeshian's grievance. [Exhibit "P-4"]. On December 17, 1980 Mr. Spencer issued his decision 
resultant from the hearing, [id.]. Mr. Spencer stated that: 
Selection on the register was canceled at my direction, as well as additional 
consideration for promotion in the Engineering Division pending the 
establishment of career paths and identifying formal criteria for the measurement 
of competency and justification for promotion. Subsequently, the Personnel 
Department approved a career path program for Civil Engineers Grade 24-28. 
Since the establishment of the career ladder program for promotion, several 
promotions have been accomplished in accordance with career ladder 
requirements. At the present time, you have not passed the Engineering in 
Engineer in Training. 
Engineering Qualification Examination. 
-^Fundamentals of Engineering. 
Professional Engineer. 
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Training Examination or the Utah State Engineering Qualification Examination 
and are therefore, not eligible for promotion under the career ladder, [id. at 
pages 1-2 f 2][emphasis added]. 
In short, Mr. Spencer maintained that Salt Lake County canceled the 1979 job announcement for 
a grade 26 engineer in Flood Control in order to implement the EIT and EQE requirements 
contained in the career ladder. In a confusing about face Mr. Spencer then disclosed that Salt 
Lake County actually promoted an engineer by grandfathering Brent Tidwell into a grade 27 
u[w]ith full knowledge of career ladder requirements and position responsibilities." [id. page 2 f 
4]. Yet no dispute existed that Brent Tidwell never passed the EIT and/or EQE so important to 
Mr. Spencer when he allegedly canceled the job announcement for the grade 26 engineer position 
in anticipation of the career ladder standards. 
On April 1, 1980 Salt Lake County first implemented the policy that required engineers to 
u[p]ass the EIT or EQE to be eligible for promotion to grade 26." [Exhibit "P-3"]. In other 
words, Salt Lake County set the career ladder policies at issue some four months after denying 
Mr. Tarkeshian promotion, yet grandfathered Brent Tidwell into a grade 27 outside the career 
ladder requirements. The April 1, 1980 policy specifically stated: 
All county Engineers assigned to the grade 24, 26, 28 career ladder must pass the 
EQE or the EIT to be eligible for promotion to grade 26. [id.][emphasis added]. 
Roy Arrigo, the Salt Lake County Classification and Compensation Manager testified that Salt 
Lake County had no written policy that established exceptions to the minimum requirements of 
successful passage of either EIT or EQE for promotion of engineers from grade 24 to grade 26. 
In particular, Salt Lake County had no written policy that allowed substitution of another 
certification such as a Professional Land Surveyor's License in lieu of successful completioi i I 
either the EIT, EQE, or eventually the F.E. and/or P.E. 
Mr. Tarkeshian appealed Mr. Spencer's December 17, 1980 decision. On February 10, 1981 the 
Merit Council for Salt Lake City issued "Findings and Conclusions and Order" (1981 Order). 
The 1981 Order concluded: 
Progression within the ladder to an Engineer 26 position required the applicant to 
possess the EIT certificate or pass the EQE. [1981 Order page 2^3] . 
Like Mr. Spencer, the Merit Counsel excepted Brent Tidwell and found: 
9 i here does exist in the Engineering Division of Salt Lake County one 
example of an employee who holds an Engineer 27 position, but who does 
not possess the EIT certificate nor has passed the EQE. 
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1A
 Said Engineer 27 position consists mostly of supervisory and 
administrative responsibility, and does not hold engineering responsibility 
beyond the expertise required for an Engineer 24 position. 
Said employee held that position prior to the time the EIT and EQE 
equirements were made part of the engineer career ladder, and thus said 
employee was left in that position in a 'grandfather' status. 
12. Said employee continues in that position as an Engineer 27, while the 
position is actually available for an Engineer 30; thus, due to his lack of 
the EIT or EQE, said employee is underfilling the position. 
i j . If and when said employee leaves the position, it must be filled by an 
engineer who is qualified according to the career ladder to possess not 
only the EIT certificate, or pass the EQE, but must also hold a Professional 
Engineer (PE) license, [id. at page 3]. 
On one hand the 1981 Order found that progression of engineers beyond a grade 24 required 
either passage of the EIT or EQE. Yet, the 1981 Order then seemed to excuse failure to pass the 
EIT or EQE by Mr. Tidwell because of his supervisory status. Then in an another about face, the 
1981 Order mandated that anyone replacing Mr. Tidwell in his grandfathered status must not 
only pass either the EIT, or the EQE, but must also have the PE license. No where in Salt Lake 
County written policy did the career ladder except supervisors from the EIT and/or EQE 
requirements. In deed, the 1981 Order mandated possession of the EIT, or EQE, in addition to 
the PE license for future supervisors who replaced Brent Tidwell. [id. at page 3 f1 ^ 
Despite the edict contained in the 1981 Order, on February 1, 19985 Salt Lake County promoted 
Reid Demman from an engineer grade 24 into Mr. Tidwell's position as an Engineer Section 
Manager grade 30. [ Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Demman had a Professional Land Surveyor License, 
but lacked a PE license6 license and/or qualifying results from either the EIT or EQE tests, [id.]. 
Before his promotion to a grade 30 engineering manager, Mr. Demman had no managerial or 
supervisory experience, [id.]. 
5
 Noted here is the fact that all of the employee actions hereafter complained of by Mr. 
Tarkeshian took place after he turned 40 years of age. None of the evidence provided by the 
parties indicated Mr. Demman's age at the time of his promotion. 
5Neal Stack, Director of the Salt Lake County Engineering Division, testified that a grade 
30 required a PE license because the grade 30 engineer signed off on design plans. 
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On December 1,1987 Salt Lake County promoted Ricky Olsen from a grade 24 engineer to a 
grade 26 Permit Supervisor in the Highway Department. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Ricky Olsen not only 
lacked any of the EIT, EQE, FE, and/or PE certifications, he also lacked a B.S. in Engineering, 
[id.]. Mr. Arrigo claimed that supervisors do not function as engineers. Ergo, Mr. Arrigo 
maintained that Mr. Olsen required none of the EIT, EQE, FE, PE certifications, nor a B.S. in 
Engineering. On January 1, 1990 Mr. Olsen became the Permit Supervisor in Public Works 
Engineering still at a grade 26. [id.]. 
In the meantime, Salt Lake County issued several announcements for engineers with varying and 
inconsistent minimum qualifications listed. In 1992 Salt Lake County issued a job 
announcement for an "ENGINEER 26" in the Development Services Division with a closing date 
of September 18, 1992 (the 1992 bulletin). [Exhibit "R-4"]. The 1992 bulletin set forth 
minimum qualifications as: 
Education and Experience 
a. Graduation from an accredited college of (sic) university with a 
bachelor's degree in Civil Engineering plus two (2) years of 
experience in a field closely related to these duties and an 
Engineer-in-Training Certificate or passage of the Utah State 
Engineer Qualifying Examination; OR 
Eight (8) years of experience in a field closely related to these 
duties for the required college study plus Engineer-in-Training 
Certificate or passage of the Utah State Engineer Qualifying 
Examination; OR 
b. An equivalent combination of education and experience 
College study in a closely related field may be substituted for up to 
two (2) years of the eight (8) years of required related experience. 
ndi. 
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The 1992 bulletin created an ambiguity that could be read in two conflicting ways. At first blush 
the 1992 bulletin seemed to conform to the April 1, 1980 policy announcement set forth in 
Exhibit "P-3" that an engineer grade 26 required passage of the EIT, or EQE, in addition to a 
Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering and two years related experience, [id.]. The 1992 
bulletin allowed certain substitutions of experience for education, [id.]. However, subparagraph 
"b" prefaced by "OR" could be read to mean that education and experience served as an 
acceptable substitute for all the requirements in subparagraph "a."[id.]. No where does the 1992 
bulletin state that a Professional Land Surveyor's License could be substituted for passage of the 
EIT, or EQE. 
Acceptance of the later interpretation of the 1992 bulletin meant that Mr. Tarkeshian who at that 
time had 15 years experience in the Salt Lake County Engineering Division, together with a B.S. 
in Civil Engineering, should not have been denied advancement to a grade 26 engineer. 
Acceptance of the first interpretation of the 1992 bulletin left Salt Lake County without an 
acceptable excuse for the promotions of Mr. Tidwell and particularly Mr. Demman. 
Salt Lake County issued a job announcement for an "ENGINEER 24/26" in the Development 
Services Division with a closing date of December 29, 1997 (The 1997 bulletin). [Exhibit "P-
fi"l The 1997 bulletin set forth minimum qualifications identical to those in the 1992 bulletin. 
In 1998 Salt Lake County issued a job announcement for an "ENGINEER 24/26,, in the 
Development Services Division with a closing date of February 13, 1998 (The Februaryl998 
bulletin). [Exhibit "R-4"]. The February 1998 bulletin set forth minimum qualifications 
identical to those in the 1992 and 1997 bulletins except, the February 1998.bulletin allowed for 
the first time a substitution of the Professional land Surveyor's license in lieu of the EIT, or EQE 
requirements. 
The "Notice of Personnel Action" contained in the records of Salt Lake County showed that it 
hired Steven Dale as a grade 26 engineer effective April 27,1998. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Arrigo 
acknowledged and Salt Lake County's own records showed that it hired Steven Dale off of the 
February 1998 bulletin, [id.]. Yet, a Salt Lake County Position Description Form demonstrated 
that effective February 1, 1998 Mr. Dale accepted the grade 26 position some 12 days before the 
closing date set forth in the job announcement bulletin, [id.]. Mr. Dale had a Professional land 
Surveyor's License but never passed the EIT, or EQE. As with Mr. Tidwell, Mr. Demman, and 
Mr. Olsen, irregularities and exceptions to normal written requirements abounded in Salt Lake 
County's hiring of Mr. Dale as a grade 26 engineer. 
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On December 31, 1998 Larry Taggert retired from Salt Lake County as a grade 24 engineer. 
[Exhibit "P-18"]. On August 4, 1999 Salt Lake County re-hired Larry Taggert as a grade 26 
engineer instead of at the grade 24 entry level then in effect. [Exhibit "P-20"]. Mr. Taggert never 
met the requirements of the EIT, EQE, FE or PE. [Exhibit-"R-3"]. Mr. Anigo maintained that 
because Salt Lake County re-hired Mr. Taggert as a temporary employee at a grade 26, no 
requirement existed for him to meet the requirements of the EIT, EQE, FE or PE. However, Mr. 
Arrigo admitted that nothing existed in written Salt Lake County policies that excused grade 26 
engineers from passage of either the EIT, EQE, FE, or PE because of a temporary employment 
classification. Neal Stack frankly acknowledged that Salt Lake County offered Mr. Taggert a 
grade 26 so that he would accept an offer to come back to work for Salt Lake County. Mr. 
Taggert remained a temporary employee from August 24, 1999, through the date of the hearing, 
some two and a half years later. 
On January 1,1999 Salt Lake County promoted Ricky Olsen from a grade 247 engineer to a 
Flood Control Supervisor Grade 28 in the Flood Control Engineering Division. [Exhibit "R-3"]. 
Mr. Olsen still had nothing by way of certification in the EIT, EQE, FE, PE, nor a B.S. Degree in 
Engineering. 
Also on January 1, 1999 Salt Lake County reclassified Denton Mecham from a grade 24 engineer 
to a grade 26 Pavement Manager. [Exhibit "P-17"]. Then, on December 16, 1999 Salt Lake 
County promoted Mr. Mecham outside the Engineering Division to Sanitation Division Director 
at a grade 33. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Mecham lacked a PE license and/or qualifying results from 
either the EIT, EQE or FE tests, [id.]. Mr. Arrigo again claimed that neither the Pavement 
Management Supervisor, nor the Sanitation Division Director, required a PE license and/or 
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests. 
On February 1, 2000 Salt Lake County utilized the "career ladder" to move Martin Knapus from 
a grade 24 engineer to a grade 26 engineer. [ Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Arrigo argued that because Mr. 
Knapus obtained a Professional Land Surveyor's License he met the "Career Ladder" criteria for 
automatic promotion to a grade 26 engineer. Yet, Mr. Knapus lacked a PE license and/or 
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests. 
On March 16, 2000 Salt Lake Public Works Department requested approval from the Personnel 
Department to restructure the career ladder in that the entry level position moved from a grade 24 
to a grade 26, the grade 26 became a grade 28, and the grade 28 became a grade 30. [Exhibit P-
11"]. The request specifically stated: 
7
 Mr. Olsen caught in a Reduction in Force action at Salt Lake County went back to an 
engineer grade 24 on May 1, 1991. 
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We respectfully request approval of the Career Ladder Plan as written for the 
Engineer 26/28/30 position. As you know, we have this classification in three 
Public Works divisions, Flood Control, Engineering, and Planning/Development 
Services. 
The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 26 to the 28 level are as 
follows: 
1. The employee has worked for one year as a grade 26. 
2. The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year as 
shown by receiving a performance evaluation with satisfactory rating. 
3. The employee has received their Fundamentals of Engineering (FE)8 
certification by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering. 
The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 28 to the 30 level are as 
follows: 
1. The employee has worked for one year as a grade 28. 
2. The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the 
year as shown by receiving a performance evaluation with 
satisfactory rating. 
3. The employee has received their Professional Engineer (PE) 
License in the State of Utah. [id.]. 
Of note the reclassification Memo of March 16, 2000 applied to three Divisions that employed 
engineers i.e. Pubhc Works divisions, Flood Control, Engineering, and Planning/Development 
Services. Importantly, the reclassification memo mentioned nothing about substituting the 
Professional Land Surveyor's License for the FE. Further, the reclassification memo made no 
exception for supervisors in the respective divisions affected by the reclassifications. 
Mr. Arrigo stated that Salt Lake County approved the reclassification proposal set forth in 
Exhibit "P-l 1" on May 1, 2000. [see: Exhibit "R-7"]. A Recruitment Announcement issued after 
approval of the reclassification of the Career ladder set forth the minimum qualifications for a 
grade 28 (the new grade 26): 
8The parties agreed that successful completion of the EIT or EQE satisfied the FE 
requirement. 
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Graduation from an accredited college or university with a bachelor's degree in 
Civil Engineering plus one (1) year of experience in a field closely related to these 
duties and the Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) Certification or equivalent. 
[Exhibit "R-4"]. 
The Recruitment Announcement after the reclassification said nothing about substituting the 
Professional Land Surveyor's License for the FE. [id.]. Also, the Recruitment Announcement 
made no exception for supervisors in the respective divisions affected by the reclassifications. 
On April 16, 2000 Salt Lake County reclassified Martin Knapus from a grade 26 to a grade 28 
pursuant to the reclassification of the Career Ladder. [Exhibit "R-3"]. Mr. Knapus' promotion to 
a grade 28 engineer took place two weeks before the actual effective date of the general 
reclassification on May 1, 2000. [Exhibit "R-7"]. Again, Mr. Knapus lacked a PE license and/or 
qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests. 
No dispute existed that all of the employees discussed in relation to this action except Mr. 
Tarkeshian were white, non-Arabic, and not of Persian/Iranian national origins. No dispute 
existed that at least six white males including Mr. Demman, Mr. Knapus, Mr. Mecham, Mr. 
Olsen, Mr. Dale, and Mr. Taggert received promotions from entry level engineers to grades 
higher than Mr. Tarkeshian who himself remained at the entry level for an engineer during his 26 
plus year career with Salt Lake County. 
None of the six white males promoted from entry level engineers to higher grades over Mr. 
Tarkeshian obtained a PE license and/or qualifying results from either the EIT, EQE, or FE tests 
as required by Salt Lake County's written policies. Salt Lake County argued exceptions applied 
for each promotion of the six white males who lacked a PE license and/or qualifying results 
from either the EIT, EQE or FE tests. The preponderance of the evidence in this case revealed 
that the exceptions articulated by Salt Lake County in promoting white, non-Arabic, non-Persian 
engineers merely served as pretexts to mask a subtle discrimination against Mr. Tarkeshian in 
violation of Utah Code § 34A-5-106.9 It is incomprehensible that Mr. Tarkeshian who in many 
cases had more experience and education than those promoted over him sat in an entry level 
engineering position for 26 years while Salt Lake County found various and sundry exceptions to 
the written rules in order to promote white, non-arabic, non-Iranian/Persian males. Salt Lake 
County always seemed able to find an exception to the rules that bound Mr. Tarkeshian to an 
entry level position in order to promote everyone but Mr. Tarkeshian. 
9
 Because I found direct discrimination by Salt Lake County against Mr. Tarkeshian 
based on race, national origin, and color, I do not reach the issues of retaliation. Mr. Tarkeshian 
presented no evidence to support his claim of age discrimination. 
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After reclassification of the "career ladder" levels from 24-26, to 26-28, on May 1, 2000, all 
entry level engineers including Mr. Tarkeshian moved from a 24 to a 26 grade. However Mr. 
Tarkeshian lost the benefit of earlier promotion. 
Salt Lake County should be compelled to promote Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 26 engineer 
effective November 13, 197910, until April 16, 200011 at which date Salt Lake County should 
reclassify Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 28 engineer. Salt Lake County should reimburse Mr. 
Tarkeshian for the difference in the pay he actually received for the time period November 13, 
1979, until the date of this Order, and the pay he would have received pursuant to the promotions 
ordered herein. 
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Utah Code § 34A-5-106(1) states in relevant part that: 
It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice: 
(a)(i) For an employer to refuse to... promote...or discriminate in matters of 
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of employment against any 
persons otherwise qualified, because of: 
(A) race; 
(B) color; 
(G) national origin 
Mr. Tarkeshian belonged to a protected class as an Arabic man of Iranian/Persian national origin 
and brown skin color. During the times relevant to this action, Mr. Tarkeshian had Bachelor of 
Science degrees in both Civil Engineering and Mathematics. Mr. Tarkeshian also had a diploma 
in Industrial Drafting from National Technical Schools of Los Angeles, California. When denied 
his first promotion in November 1979 Mr. Tarkeshian had two years experience in Salt Lake 
County's Engineering Division together with other experience in the engineering field. Absent 
the exceptions made by Salt Lake County for white, non-Arabic, non Iranian/Persian, engineers, 
Mr. Tarkeshian qualified for promotion from the entry level engineer grade to the next grade 
level in the Career Ladder for engineers the same as others promoted over him. 
10The date Salt Lake County first denied Mr. Tarkeshian promotion to the grade 26. 
11
 The first date evidenced in this case that an engineer received reclassification 
promotion from grade 26 to 28. (i.e. Martin Knapus). 
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In summary, Salt Lake County discriminated against Mr. Tarkeshian based on his race, Arabic, 
National Origin, Iranian/Persian, and color, brown. The exceptions articulated by Salt Lake 
County in promoting white, non-Arabic, non-Persian engineers merely served as pretexts to 
mask a subtle discrimination against Mr. Tarkeshian in violation of Utah Code § 34A-5-106. 
Salt Lake County must promote Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 26 engineer effective November 13, 
1979, until April 16, 2000, at which date Salt Lake County must reclassify Mr. Tarkeshian to a 
grade 28 engineer. Salt Lake County must reimburse Mr. Tarkeshian for the difference in the 
pay he actually received for the time period November 13, 1979, until the date of this Order, and 
the pay he would have received pursuant to the promotions ordered herein. 
VI. ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Salt Lake County shall promote Mr. Tarkeshian to a 
grade 26 engineer effective November 13, 1979, until April 16,2000, at which date Salt Lake 
County shall reclassify Mr. Tarkeshian to a grade 28 engineer. Salt Lake County shall 
reimburse Mr. Tarkeshian for the difference in the pay he actually received for the time period 
November 13, 1979, until the date of this Order, and the pay he would have received pursuant to 
the promotions ordered herein together with interest at eight percent (8%). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Salt Lake County shall cease all discriminatory practices 
toward Mostafa Tarkeshian. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than October 22, 2003, Mostafa Tarkeshian's 
attorney, Ashley Jolly, shall file an affidavit setting forth in detail his attorneys' fees relevant to 
this matter. The respondents shall no later than November 3, 2003, file objections, if any, with 
respect to Ashley Jolly's attorneys' fees affidavit. Thereafter, I will issue a supplemental Order 
with respect to attorneys' fees in this matter. 
Dated this 9th day of October 2003, 
Richard M. La Jeunesse 
.dministrative Law Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the'specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS, * Case No. 8-00-0083 
Defendant. * 
* 
Salt Lake County asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review 
Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse's determination that the County violated the Utah 
Antidiscrimination Act (Title 34A, Chapter 5, Utah Code Annotated; ("the Act" hereafter) by 
engaging in unlawful employment discrimination against Mostafa Tarkeshian. 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
12 and Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-107(l 1). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On November 16,1999, Mr. Tarkeshian filed a complaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination 
and Labor Division ("UALD") alleging the County had refused to promote him because of his 
national origin, race, color and age, thereby violating the Utah Antidiscrimination Act. UALD 
investigated the complaint but found no violation of the Act. Mr. Tarkeshian then requested a formal 
de novo evidentiary hearing on his complaint as allowed by §34A-5-107(4)(c) of the Act. 
Judge La Jeunesse conducted the evidentiary hearing on April 14,2003. During the course of 
the hearing, Mr. Tarkeshian limited his charges against the County to discrimination based on 
national origin and retaliation. On October 9, 2003, Judge La Jeunesse ruled that the County had 
unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Tarkeshian. 
In seeking Appeals Board review of this matter, the County challenges Judge La Jeunesse's 
findings of fact and his ultimate conclusion of unlawful discrimination. In reviewing Judge La 
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Jeunesse's decision, the Appeals Board may substitute its judgment for that of Judge La Jeunesse, 
United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807,811 (Utah 1980), and may affirm, 
modify or reverse his decision, or remand for further proceedings. See §34A-1-303(4) Utah Code 
Annotated. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Having carefully considered the testimony and documentary evidence presented at the 
hearing in this matter, the Appeals Board enters the following findings of fact and sets aside Judge 
La Jeunesse's findings to the extent they are inconsistent with these findings. 
Mr. Tarkeshian is of Iranian national origin. He holds Bachelor of Science degrees in both 
mathematics and engineering. He has been employed as an engineer by the Salt Lake County Public 
Works Department since 1977. The Public Works Department is comprised of several divisions, 
including the Engineering Division, where Mr. Tarkeshian works on flood control projects, and the 
Development Services Division, which includes engineers who review subdivision surveys and 
designs. 
Mr. Tarkeshian began his career with the County at a "grade 24," what was then the entry 
level for engineers. In 1980, the County established standards by which engineers could advance to 
higher grades within the County's personnel classification system. Under this "career ladder," the 
entry level for engineers remained at grade 24. However, engineers who obtained one of several 
specified professional engineering certifications were entitled to automatic advancement to grade 26. 
Additional qualifications were established for further advancement to grade 28.l 
The County assisted its entry level engineers in obtaining certification by authorizing use of 
work time for study, providing study materials and also establishing study groups. For personal 
reasons, Mr. Tarkeshian did not avail himself of these opportunities and has never obtained 
certification. 
Some years after instituting its career ladder for engineers, the County recognized that 
engineers working in its Development Services Division had substantial responsibilities related to 
land surveys. For that reason, the County permitted engineers in that division to substitute a 
surveyor's license for the engineering certification that was otherwise required under the career 
ladder standard. In other words, engineers in the Development Services Division were advanced 
from grade 24 to grade 26 without engineering certification if, instead, they obtained a surveyor's 
license. In implementing this policy, the County did not adequately update its written career path 
l A few years ago, the entire career ladder was upgraded, with the grades increasing from 24/26/28 
to 26/28/30. 
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policy. However, the new policy was incorporated in recruitment bulletins during 1998 and 
thereafter and was consistently applied within the Development Services Division. For engineers 
working in other divisions the engineering certification requirement continued to be applied. 
The foregoing requirements applied only to those County employees classified as engineers 
and not to other classifications. The County Personnel Director, rather than the County's individual 
departments or division, establishes minimum job qualifications. 
Mr. Tarkeshian has identified a number of individuals he believes were promoted to higher 
grade levels despite their lack of engineering certification. The circumstances of each of these 
individuals are discussed below. 
• Brent Tidwell. At the time the County instituted its engineering career ladder, Mr. 
Tidwell was already employed as engineering section manager within the Development 
Services Division at a grade 27. He did not have engineering certifications, but his position 
was primarily supervisory and administrative. The County allowed him to remain where he 
was. At some point, he obtained a surveyor's license and his grade was increased. 
• Reid Penman. Mr. Denman began work for the County in 1976 and, over 25 years, 
worked his way through various survey and engineering technician jobs until he was selected 
for an opening as an entry level, grade 24 engineer in the Development Services Division. 
After six years in that position, he was selected to manage the Division, thereby replacing Mr. 
Tidwell. Mr. Denman had a surveyor's license. 
• Martin Knaphus. Mr. Knaphus was employed as an engineer, grade 28, in the 
Development Services Division. He has a surveyor's license. 
• Denton Mecham. Mr. Mecham is currently Director of the Sanitation Division, at a grade 
33. In that capacity, he performs no engineering functions and no certification is required. 
Prior to his current position, he was Pavement Management Supervisor at a grade 26 in the 
Public Works Operations Division. That position did not require any certification. 
• Ricky Olsen. Mr. Olsen is Flood Control Supervisor, Grade 28. His position does not 
require professional certification. 
• Larry Taggart. Mr. Taggart retired from County service in December 1998, as an 
engineer 24 in the same Division as Mr. Tarkeshian. He does not have a professional 
engineer certification. He was rehired as a temporary part-time employee during August, 
1999 at grade 26. As a temporary employee his hourly wage is 25% less than the wage he 
received before retirement. He receives no fringe benefits and has no merit protection. 
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County policy exempts temporary individuals from meeting minimum job qualifications that 
would be applicable to full time merit employees. 
• Stephen Dale. Mr. Dale was hired in 1998 as an engineer, grade 26, in the Development 
Services Division. He has a surveyor's license. 
Mr. Tarkeshian receives a performance evaluation from his supervisor each year. At the end 
of 1998, he was rated as meeting or exceeding expectations in all categories of his evaluation. During 
November 1999, Mr. Tarkeshian filed his discrimination complaint against the County. A few 
months later, he received his performance evaluation for 1999. The evaluation was somewhat lower 
than the year before. Mr. Tarkeshian received an unsatisfactory evaluation in one of the seven 
categories, but was rated as meeting expectations in 5 other categories. He received an "exceeding 
expectations" rating in one category. Overall, he was rated as successful for 1999. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-5-106 of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act prohibits employers from 
discriminating in the terms or conditions of employment because of, among other factors, national 
origin. Section 106 also prohibits retaliation against employees who have filed discrimination 
complaints. These provisions of the Act are equivalent to federal statutes prohibiting employment 
discrimination. Therefore, in interpreting and applying the Utah Act, the Commission and Utah's 
appellate courts have generally followed the precedent established by the federal courts in 
interpreting and applying federal antidiscrimination law. Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 
P.3d 993, 995 (Utah App.); Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 
1995); University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987). The Appeals Board 
will likewise consider federal precedent in evaluating Mr. Tarkeshian's claims of discrimination 
based on his national origin and retaliation. 
Mr. Tarkeshian's claim of discrimination based on national origin. Mr. Tarkeshian contends 
that, because of his Iranian national origin, the County applied more stringent "career ladder" 
requirements to him than it applied to other County engineers. Mr. Tarkeshian further contends that 
this discrimination prevented him from receiving the increases in grade and pay that other similarly 
situated employees received. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.792 (1973), the United States Supreme Court 
defined the burden of production and order for presentation of proof for claims of intentional 
discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. In such cases, the individual alleging 
discrimination must first establish a "prima facie" case. The employer is then required to come 
forward with a non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. If the employer produces such an 
explanation, it falls to the trier of fact to decide the ultimate question: Did the employer intentionally 
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discriminate against the employee for an unlawful reason. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502; also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, (2000); also Victron/Lika, 38 
P.3dat995. 
Here, Mr. Tarkeshian has discharged his initial obligation of establishing aprimafacie claim 
of employment discrimination, based on national origin. Likewise, the County has fulfilled its 
obligation of providing a non-discriminatory explanation of its treatment of Mr.Tarkeshian. With the 
case in this posture and considering all relevant evidence and permissible inferences, the Appeals 
Board must address the ultimate question: Did the County in fact, discriminate against Mr. 
Tarkeshian because of his national origin? In considering this ultimate question, the Appeals Board 
finds the following facts to be persuasive. 
Mr. Tarkeshian has been employed by the County for more than 25 years. He has identified 
no instances during that time of any conflict or comment from co-worker, supervisor or manager 
related to his national origin. Furthermore, Mr. Tarkeshian has presented no evidence regarding the 
national origin of his co-workers and supervisors. The Appeals Board finds that Mr. Tarkeshian's 
national origin was not a factor in his work environment. 
Mr. Tarkeshian acknowledges that, for many years, the County has had a "career ladder" for 
engineers that allowed for professional development and concomitant advancement in grade and pay. 
Mr. Tarkeshian also acknowledges that he has not obtained any of the professional certifications that 
would allow him to automatically move up the career ladder from an entry level grade 24 to a grade 
26. Consequently, the County's career ladder system appears to be a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
explanation for Mr. Tarkeshian's failure to advance. 
However, Mr. Tarkeshian argues the County's career ladder should not be taken at face value 
because it has been inconsistently applied to favor other individuals who are similarly situated to Mr. 
Tarkeshian, but are not of Iranian national origin. It is Mr. Tarkeshian's theory that because of his 
national origin, he has remained at the bottom rung of the career ladder. 
The Appeals Board has carefully considered the evidence presented by Mr. Tarkeshian and 
the County regarding the advancement of other engineers in County service and the failure to 
advance Mr. Tarkeshian. The Appeals Board concludes that the so-called disparities in treatment are 
attributable to the other engineers meeting the County's requirements for advancement and other 
legitimate reasons that are not related to Mr. Tarkeshian's national origin. 
Most of the individuals identified by Mr. Tarkeshian as having received favorable treatment 
were in the Development Division. As such, their duties focused on evaluation and approval of 
subdivision surveys. It was reasonable for the County to allow engineers in that division to 
substitute a surveyor's license for the engineering certification that was otherwise required by the 
career ladder system. 
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Mr. Tarkeshian has also identified individuals who have been promoted to manage various 
divisions who lack engineering certification. However, it is undisputed that the County's personnel 
classification system does not require engineering certifications for the individuals in those positions. 
Furthermore, Mr. Tarkeshian has not applied for these or any other management positions with the 
County. 
Finally, Mr. Tarkeshian points to Mr. Taggart, who also lacks any engineering certification 
and who retired from County service as an engineer 24 in the same division as Mr. Tarkeshian. Mr. 
Taggart was later rehired as a temporary part-time employee at a grade 26. However, as a temporary 
employee, Mr. Taggart is paid 25% less than the wage he received before retirement, with no fringe 
benefits or merit protection. Thus, the grade designation for temporary part-time employees is not 
directly comparable to the grade designation for regular employees. Under these circumstances, the 
Appeals Board is unable to conclude that Mr. Taggart has been treated more favorably than Mr. 
Tarkeshian. 
In light of the foregoing facts surrounding the relative treatment of Mr. Tarkeshian and his 
co-workers at the County, the Appeals Board concludes that any differences are attributable to 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons and are not related to Mr. Tarkeshian's national origin. While 
the County could have done a better job of conforming its written policies to its actual practices that 
inadequacy, when viewed in the context of all the evidence, does not persuade the Appeals Board 
that the County was engaged in unlawful employment discrimination against Mr. Tarkeshian. 
Mr. Tarkeshian7 s allegation of retaliation. Although Mr. Tarkeshian contends the County 
retaliated against him for filing a discrimination complaint with UALD, the only alleged retaliation 
was a reduction in the subjective evaluation of his work performance from the 1998 to the 1999 
evaluation. But in both years Mr. Tarkeshian received at least a "successful" evaluation. He has 
presented no evidence that his marginally lower evaluation in 1999 had any consequence with 
respect to the terms or conditions of his employment or any likely effect on future job opportunities. 
Without such evidence that he suffered an "adverse action," Mr. Tarkeshian's retaliation claim must 
fail. Tran v. Trustees of the State Colleges. 355 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2004), citing Burlington 
Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth. 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Hillig v. Rumsfeld. 2004 W.L 190946 (10th 
Circuit August 27, 2004). The Appeals Board therefore finds it unnecessary to consider the other 
elements of that claim. 
Conclusion. In summary, the Appeals Board concludes that the County did not 
discriminate against Mr. Tarkeshian because of his national origin, nor did the County retaliate 
against Mr. Tarkeshian for having filed a discrimination complaint against the County. 
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ORDER 
The Appeals Board grants Salt Lake County's motion for review, sets aside Judge La 
Jeunesse's decision in this matter, and dismisses Mr. Tarkeshian's claims of employment 
discrimination against the County. It is so ordered. 
Dated this J?/ day of October, 2004. 
"C~olleen"S. Coltbn, Chair 
Patricia S. Drawe 
Thomas Carlson' 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
2 Appeals Board member Joseph Hatch having recused himself from participating as a member 
of the Appeals Board in this matter, the remaining members of the Appeals Board have 
temporarily designated Thomas Carlson to serve in place of Mr. Hatch, pursuant to §34A-1-
303(5)(c) of the Utah Labor Commission Act. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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SHERRIE HAYASHI, DIRECTOR 
UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION AND LABOR DIVISION 
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17-32-4 COUNTIES 
His tory: L. 1965, ch. 29, *} 3; 1990, eh. 283, Cross-References . — Countv treasure] 
fc 6. Chapter 24 of tins title r, 
17-32-4. Oaths and bonds to be filed. 
The oath and bond of the office of a bail commissioner shall be filed with the 
county clerks* of their respective counties. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 29, <? 4; 1990, ch. 283, Cross-Rcterences . — County clerk, Chap-
fc 7. ter 20 of tins title 
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sonnel management — Per-
sonnel functions of county 
agencies, departments, or of-
ficea 
Career service — Exempt posi-
tions 
Acceptance of exempt position 
by career service employee — 
Reappointment register 
Grievance and appeals proce-
dure — Employees' com-
plaints of discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice. 
Political activities of employees 
Reciprocal agreements for ben-
efit of system — Cooperation 
by director with other govern-
mental agencies 
Prohibited actions 
Violations — Misdemeanor — 
Ineligibility for employment 
and forfeiture of position 
Duty of county legislative body 
to provide rules or regulations 
— Conflicts with state or fed-
eral law 
17-33-1. Title — Establishment of merit system — Sepa-
rate systems for peace officers and firemen rec-
ognized — Options of small counties. 
(V This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "County Personnel 
Management Act " 
(2) A merit system of personnel administration for the counties of the state 
of Utah, their departments, offices, and agencies, except as otherwise specifi-
cally provided, is established 
(3) This chapter recognizes the existence of the merit systems for peace 
officers of the several counties as provided for m Chapter 30, Deputy Sheriffs 
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— Merit System, and for firemen of the several counties as provided for m 
Chapter 28, Firemen's Civil Service Commission, and is intended to give 
county commissions the option of using the provisions of this chaptei as a 
single meiit system for all county employees oi m combination with these 
existing systems for firemen and peace officers 
(4) This chapter is optional with counties having fewer than 130 full-time, 
part-time, and seasonal employees and elected officials not covered by other 
merit systems 
History. C. 1953, 17-33-1, enac t ed by L Amendmen t Notes . - - fht 2001 aire id 
1981, eh . 81, *} 2; 2001, ch. 241, *> 46. ment effective April 30 2001, ,n Subsection <J; 
Repeals* a n d R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws updated code citations, m Substcion (4j sub 
1983, ch 81 § 1 repeals forrrer H 17 33 1 to sbtuted 'full-time part time and ^.oasonai em 
17 33 20 as enacted by Laws 1969 ch 45 ^ 3 ployees and elected officials for ' emplo)C(^ 
to 20, and as amended by Laws 1977, ch 61, and made stylistic chang* s 
§ 1, 1978, ch 5, § 1 and 1979, ch 61, § 1 Cross-References . — State personnel man 
relating to the county merit system Laws 1981, affement Title 67, Chaptei 19 
ch 81, § 2 enacts present §§ 17-33-1 to 17 33 
14 Laws 1981, ch 81 § 3 enacts piesent 
§ 17-33-15 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am J u r . 2d. — 15A Am Jur 2d Civil Service random or mass d^ug testing of public employ 
§ 1 et seq ees oi persons whose employment is ipgulattd 
A.L.R. — Validity, under Federal Constitu by state, local, oi federal go\ erament 86 A L R 
tion of regulations rules, or statutes requiring Fed 420 
17-33-2, Definitions. 
As used m this chapter 
(1) "Career service position' means any position m the county service 
except those exempted under Section 17-33-8 
(2) "Council" means the career service couneiJ, a three-member appeals 
and personnel advisory board 
(3) "Director" means the director of personnel management 
(4) "Eligible applicant' means any applicant that meets the job related 
minimum requirements established for a position m the career service 
(5) "Eligible list" means a list of eligible applicants ran ted in order of 
relative knowledge, skill, ability and merit 
(6) "Exempt positions" means those positions which aie not m the 
career service as specified m Section 17-33-8 
(7) "Merit system" means a system of personnel administration based 
on the principles set forth m Section 17-33-3 
(8) "Position classification" means a grouping of positions under the 
same title which aie sufficiently similar to be compensated at the s a n e 
salary range and to which the same tests of ability can be applied 
(9) "Provisional appointment" means an aprointment to fill a position 
pending the establishment of a register for such po^inon 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-2, e n a c t e d by L. ment, effectne Ma} 3, 1999 deJe^d foimer 
1981, ch. 81, * 2; 1993, ch. 227, * 160, 1994, Subsection (2) which defined 'certincauoa,' re 
ch, 12, «> 13; 3994, ch 146, <> 15, 1999, ch designating the b lowing subsections a<u;H 
182, * 1.
 m g l y 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1999 amend 
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17-33-3. Merit principles. 
It is the policy of this state that each county may establish a personnel 
system administered in a manner that will provide for the effective implemen-
tation of the following merit principles: 
(1) recruiting, selecting, and advancing employees on the basis of their 
relative ability, knowledge, and skills, including open consideration of 
qualified applicants for initial appointment; 
(2) provision of equitable and adequate compensation; 
(3) training of employees as needed to assure high-quality performance; 
(4) retention of employees on the basis of the adequacy of their 
performance, and separation of employees whose inadequate performance 
cannot be corrected; 
(5) fair treatment of applicants and employees in all aspects of person-
nel administration without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, political affiliation, age, or disability, and with proper regard for 
their privacy and constitutional rights as citizens; 
(6) provision of information to employees regarding their political 
rights and prohibited practices under the Hatch Act; and 
(7) provision of a formal procedure for processing the appeals and 
grievances of employees without discrimination, coercion, restraint, or 
reprisal. 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-3, enacted by L. made a stylistic change. 
1981, ch. 81, § 2; 2001, ch. 73, § 11. Federal Law. — The federal Hatch Act, 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 2001 amend- cited in Subsection (6), is 5 U.S C. § 1501 et 
merit, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection (5) seq. 
substituted "disability" for "handicap" and 
17-33-4. Career service council — Members and alternate 
members — Powers and duties — Appeals — 
Time limit — Qualifications, appointment, terms, 
and compensation of council members. 
(1) (a) (i) There shall be in each county establishing a system a three-
member bipartisan career service council appointed by the county 
executive. The members of the council shall be persons in sympathy 
with the application of merit principles to public employment. 
(ii) (A) The county executive may appoint alternate members of 
the career service council to hear-appeals that one or more 
regular career service council members are unable to hear. 
(B) The term of an alternate member of the career service 
council may not exceed one year. 
(b) The council shall hear appeals not resolved at lower levels in the 
cases of career service employees suspended, transferred, demoted, or 
dismissed as well in the cases of other grievances not resolved by the 
grievance procedure at the division or departmental level. 
(c) The career service council: 
(i) may make an initial determination in each appeal whether the 
appeal is one of the types of matters under Subsection (l)(bj over 
which the council has jurisdiction; 
748 
C( >UNTY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT 17-33-4 
(ii> shall review written appeals in cases of applicants rejected for 
examination and report final binding appeals decisions, in writing, to 
the county legislative body, 
(iii) may not hear any other personnel matter; and 
(iv) may affirm, modify, vacate, or set aside an order for disciplinary 
action 
(d) (i) A person adversely affected by a decision of the career service 
council may appeal the decision to the district court. 
(ii) An appeal to the district court under this Subsection Q)(d) is 
barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the career service council 
issues its decision. 
(iiij If there is a record of the career service council proceedings, the 
district court review shall be limited to the record provided by the 
career service council. 
(iv) In reviewing a decision of the career service council, the district 
court shall presume that the decision is valid and may determine only 
whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious. 
(2) Each council member shall serve a term of three years to expire on June 
30, three years after the date of his or her appointment, except that original 
appointees shall be chosen as follows: one member for a term expiring June 30, 
1982; one member for a term expiring June 30, 1983; and one member for a 
term expiring June 30, 1984. Successors of original council members shall be 
chosen for three-year terms. An appointment to fill a vacancy on the council 
shall be for only the unexpired term of the appointee's successor. Each member 
of the board shah hold office until his successor is appointed and confirmed. A 
member of the council may be removed by the county executive for cause, after 
having been given a copy of the charges against him or her and an opportunity 
to be heard publicly on the charges before the county legislative body. Adequate 
annual appropriations shall be made available to enable the council effectively 
to carry out its duties under this law. 
(3) Members and alternates of the council shall be United States citizens 
and be actual and bona fide residents of the state of Utah and the county from 
which appointed for a period of not less than one year preceding the date of 
appointment and a member may not hold another government office or be 
employed by the county. 
(4) The council shall elect one of its members as chairperson, and two or 
more members of the council shall constitute a quorum necessary for carrying 
on the business and activity of the council. 
& The council shall have subpoena power to compel attendance of wit-
nesses, and to authorize witness fees where it deems appropriate, to be paid at 
the same rate as in justice courts. 
(6) (a) li) Council members shall receive compensation for each day or 
partial day they are in session at a per diem rate determined by the 
county legislative body. 
dix An alternate member shall receive compensation for each day 
or partial day that the alternate member is required to replace a 
regular council member, ai a per diem rate determined by the county 
legislative body 
(b) The county legislative body may periodically adjust the compensa-
tion rate for inflation. 
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His tory : C. 1953, 17-33-4, enac t ed by L. 
1981, ch . 81 , § 2; 1994, ch. U6, *t J 6; 1999, 
ch. 182, <> 2; 2001. eh. 241, $ 47. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1999 amend-
ment, effective Ma/ 3 1999, subdivided Subsec-
tion Q) inserted "career service" in Subsection 
(] Kb) added the introductory phrase m Subsec-
tion OKc), added Subsections (l)(c)(i) and 
(Dk'/in), added "Notwithstanding the other 
provisions of this Subsection ( i T m Subsection 
(l)(d) subt-ntuted va pei d»era rate determined 
bv the county legislative body" tor ' the rate oi 
$50 per dieni" in Subsection (C), and made 
related and stylistic changes throughout the 
section 
His tory : C. 1953, 17-33-4.5, enac t ed bv L, 
2001, ch. 241, <j 48. 
Effective Da tes , — Laws 2001 ch 241 
(V (a) Each county executive shall: 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 
2001, m Subsection (l)iaKi) substituted 'execu-
tive" for "legislative body," added Subsections 
(l)(a)(ii) and (IXcXiv), substituted the piesent 
Subsection (l)(d) for former provisions which 
stated that the light of appeal shall not be 
abridged and referred to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in Subsection (2j substituted 
"county executive" for 'governing body," in Sub-
section (3) added "and alternates" near the 
beginning, added Subsection i6)(a)(ii), and 
made related changes 
Cross-References . — Fees of jurors and 
witnesses, § 78-46-24 et seq 
became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
17-35-5, Office of personnel management — Director — 
Appointment and responsibilities — Personnel 
rules. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Immuni ty . service were protected by quasi-judicial lmmu-
In a civil rights action brought by a prison nity because their functions and duties were 
psychiatrist who had been reassigned and sub- comparable to state judges' Atiya v Salt Lake 
sequently discharged for cuticizmg a local jail's County, 988 F.2d 1013 (10th Cir. 1993) 
conditions, individual members of the career 
17-33-4.5. Council may refer an appeal to an administra-
tive law judge for a recommendation — Council 
action on recommendation. 
(1) (a) A conniy legislative body may appoint one or more administrative 
law judges to hear appeals referred by a career service council under this 
section. 
(b) Each administrative lav/ judge shall be trained and experienced in 
personnel matters 
(2) (a) If a career service council determines that it is in the county's best 
interest, it may initially refer an appeal to an administrative law judge 
who has been appointed under Subsection (1). 
(b) After holding a hearing, the administrative law judge shall make 
findings of fact and a recommendation to the career service council. 
(c) After receiving the administrative law judge's recommendation, a 
career service council may request the administrative law judge to hold a 
further factual hearing before the career service council's decision. 
(d) A career service council may adopt or reject an administrative law 
judge's recommendation, whether before or after a further hearing under 
Subsection (2)(c) 
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(i) create an office of personnel management, administered by a 
director of personnel management; and 
(ii) ensure that the director is a person with proven experience in 
personnel management. 
(b) The position of director oi personnel management shall be: 
(i) a merit position; and 
(11) filled as provided m Subsection (lKcj. 
(c) The career service council shall' 
(i) advertise and recruit for the director position in the same 
manner as for merit positions, 
(ii) select three names from a register, and 
(hi) submit those names as recommendations to the county legis-
lative body, 
(dj The county legislative body shall select a person to serve as director 
of the office of personnel management from the names submitted to it by 
the career service council. 
(2) The director of personnel management shall: 
(a) encourage and exercise leadership in the development of expertise 
in personnel administiation within the several departments, offices, and 
agencies in the county service and make available the facilities of the office 
of personnel management to this end. 
(b) advise the county legislative and executive bodies on the use of 
human resources; 
(c) develop and implement programs for the improvement of employee 
effectiveness, such as training, safety, health, counseling, and welfare; 
(d) investigate periodically the operation and effect of this law and of 
the policies made under it and report findings and recommendations to the 
county legislative body; 
(e) establish and maintain records of all employees in the county 
service, setting forth as to each employee class, title, pay or status, and 
other relevant data; 
(f) make an annual report to the county legislative body and county 
executive regarding the work of the department; and 
(g) apply and carry out this law and the policies under it and perform 
any other lawful acts that arc necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
law. 
(3) (a) (i) The director shall recommend personnel rules for the county. 
(ii) The county legislative body may approve, amend, or reject those 
rules before they are adopted, 
(b) The rules shall provide for. 
(i) recruiting efforts to be planned and carried out in a manner that 
assures open competition, with special emphasis to be placed on 
recruiting efforts to attract minorities, women, persons with a disabil-
ity as denned by and covered under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12102, or other groups that are substantially 
underrepresented in the county work force to help assure they will be 
among the candidates from whom appointments are made; 
(ii) the establishment of job related minimum requirements wher-
ever practical, that all successful candidates shail be required to meet 
in order to be eligible for consideration for appointment or promotion, 
(hi) selection procedures that include consideration of the relative 
merit of each applicant for employment, a job related method of 
751 
17-33-5 COUNTIES 
determining the eligibility or ineligibility of each applicant, and a 
valid, reliable, and objective system of ranking eligible applicants 
according to their qualifications and merit; 
(iv) certification procedures that insure equitable consideration of 
an appropriate number of the most qualified eligible applicants based 
on the ranking system; 
(v) appointments to positions in the career service by selection from 
the most qualified eligible applicants certified on eligible lists estab-
lished in accordance with Subsections (3)(b)(iiij and (iv); 
(vi) noncompetitive appointments in the occasional instance where 
there is evidence that open or limited competition is not practical, 
such as for unskilled positions that have no minimum job require-
ments; 
(vii) limitation of competitions at the discretion of the director for 
appropriate positions to facilitate employment of qualified applicants 
with a substantial physical or mental impairment, or other groups 
protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; 
(viii) permanent appointment for entry to the career service that 
shall be contingent upon satisfactory performance by the employee 
during a period of six months, with the probationary period extend-
able for a period not to exceed six months for good cause, but with the 
condition that the probationary employee may appeal directly to the 
council any undue prolongation of the period designed to thwart merit 
principles; 
(ix) temporary, provisional, or other noncareer service appoint-
ments, which may not be used as a way of defeating the purpose of the 
career service and may not exceed 90 days, with the period extendable 
for a period not to exceed an additional 90 days for good cause; 
(x) lists of eligible applicants normally to be used, if available, for 
filling temporary positions, and short term emergency appointments 
to be made without regard to the other provisions of law to provide for 
maintenance of essential services in an emergency situation where 
normal procedures are not practical, these emergency appointments 
not to exceed 90 days, with that period extendable for a period not to 
exceed an additional 90 days for good cause; 
(xi) promotion and career ladder advancement of employees to 
higher level positions and assurance that all persons promoted are 
qualified for the position; 
(xii) recognition of the equivalency of other merit processes by 
waiving, at the discretion of the director, the open competitive 
examination for placement in the career service positions of those who 
were originally selected through a competitive examination process in 
another governmental entity, the individual in those cases, to serve a 
probationary period; 
(xiii) preparation, maintenance, and revision of a position classifi-
cation plan for all positions in the career service, based upon similar-
ity of duties performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same 
qualifications may reasonably be required for, and the same schedule 
of pay may be equitably applied to, all positions in the same class, the 
compensation plan, in order to maintain a high quality public work 
force, to take into account the responsibility and difficulty of the work, 
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the comparative pay and benefits needed to compete m the labor 
market and to stay in proper alignment with other similar govern-
mental units, and other factors; 
(xiv) keeping records of performance on all employees in the career 
service and requiring consideration of performance records in deter-
mining salary increases, any benefits for meritorious service, promo-
tions, the order of layoffs and reinstatements, demotions, discharges, 
and transfers; 
(xv) establishment of a plan governing layoffs resulting from lack of 
funds or work, abolition oppositions, or material changes in duties or 
organization, and governing reemployment of persons so laid off, 
taking into account with regard to layoffs and reemployment the 
relative ability, seniority, and merit of each employee; 
(xvi) establishment of a plan for resolving employee grievances and 
complaints with final and binding decisions; 
(xvii) establishment of disciplinary measures such as suspension, 
demotion in rank or grade, or discharge, measures to provide for 
presentation of charges, hearing rights, and appeals for all permanent 
employees in the career service to the career service council; 
(xviii) establishment of a procedure for employee development and 
improvement of poor performance; 
(xix) establishment of hours of work, holidays, and attendance 
requirements in various classes of positions in the career service; 
(xx) establishment and publicizing of fringe benefits such as insur-
ance, retirement, and leave programs, and 
(xxi) any other requirements not inconsistent with this law that 
are proper for its enforcement. 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-5, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 81, ^ 2; 1989, ch. 132, * 1; 1992, ch. 
275, * 1; 1993, ch. 227, 4} 161; 1994, ch. 146, 
* 17; 1999, ch. 182, * 3; 2001, ch. 73, <? 12; 
2001, ch. 241, * 49. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1999, inserted "for em-
ployment" in Subsection (3)(b)(m), substituted 
"and career ladder advancement" for "m such a 
manner that eligible permanent career service 
employees are considered" m Subsection 
(3)(b)(xi), deleted "m the state" after "govern-
mental units" in Subsection (3)(b)(xm), and 
made stylistic changes in the section 
The 2001 amendment by ch 73, effective 
April 30, 2001, m Subsection (3)(b)(i) substi-
tuted "persons with a disability as denned by 
and covered under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, 42 U S C 12102" for "handi-
capped' and made stylistic changes 
Layoff plan. 
A county was not authorized to adopt stan-
dards for laying off employees different from 
those required undei Subsection (3)(b)(xv), 
thus, an employer was required to consider all 
The 2001 amendment by ch 241, effective 
April 30, 2001, m Subsection (IXa) substituted 
"executive" for "legislative body," substituted 
the present Subsection (1Kb) for the former 
which described the length of term and ap-
pointment of another personnel manager, in 
Subsection (2)(f) added "and county executive," 
in Subsection (3)(a) substituted "recommend" 
for "issue" and "adopted" for "implemented," 
and made stylistic changes 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
Meaning of "this law." — The term "this 
law," as used m this section, apparently means 
Laws 1981, ch 81, codified as ^ 17-33-1 to 
17-33-15 
Federal Law. — Title VII of the federal Civil 
Rights Act, cited in Subsection (3)(b)(vn) is 42 
U S C 5; 2000e et seq 
three statutory criteria in making reduction in 
force determinations Thurston v Box EJder 
County, 835 P2d 165 (Utah 1992) 
A county may not consider factors in addition 
to relative ability, seniority, and merit, allowing 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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consideration of factors beyond those stated in when interpreting an ambiguous provision of 
Subsection (3)(b)(xv) would result in no layoff the manua l thus, even though the prior deci-
plan at all, leaving employees subject to arbi- sion finding that a county wrongfully termi-
trary treatment by their superiors Thurston v nated an employee overstated the applicability 
Box Elder County 835 P2d 165 (Utah 1992) of the Act to the county's personnel policies and 
County's use of language from the County procedure, the earlier holding would remain 
Personnel Management Act m writing the em- the law of the case for the purposes of resolving 
ployee reduction in force provision of its policies the ambiguity of the manual's provision 
and procedures manual manifested an intent to Thurston v Box Elder County, 892 P2d 1034 
be subject to a court's interpretation of the Act (Utah 1995) 
17-33-6. Certification of eligibility by director — Power of 
director to examine payrolls. 
No new employee shall be hired in a position covered by this chapter, and no 
employee shall be changed in pay, title, or status, nor shall any employee be 
paid, unless certified by the director as eligible under the provisions of, or 
regulations promulgated under, this chapter. The director of personnel man-
agement may examine payrolls at any time to determine conformity with this 
chapter and the county rules. 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-6, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 81, <} 2. 
17-33-7. Functions of county office of personnel manage-
ment — Personnel functions of county agencies, 
departments, or offices. 
(1) (a) The county office of personnel management shall perform the func-
tions required by this Subsection (1). 
(b) The county executive, county legislative body, and county office of 
personnel management may not delegate those functions to a separate 
county agency, office, or department. 
(c) The county office of personnel management shall: 
(i) design and administer a county pay plan that includes salaries, 
wages, incentives, bonuses, leave, insurance, retirement, and other 
benefits; 
(ii) design and administer the county classification plan and grade 
allocation system, including final decisions on position classification 
and grade allocation; 
(iii) conduct position classification studies, including periodic desk 
audits, except that an agency, department, or office may submit 
classification recommendations to the county office of personnel 
management; 
(iv) maintain registers of publicly recruited applicants and certifi-
cation of top-ranking eligible applicants; 
(v) monitor county agency, department, or office personnel prac-
tices to determine compliance with equal opportunity and affirmative 
action guidelines, and 
(vi) maintain central personnel records. 
(d) The county legislative body may approve, amend, or reject the pay 
plan. 
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(2) County agencies, departments, or offices shall 
(a) establish initial job descriptions, 
(h) recommend position classifications and grade allocations, 
(c) make final selections for appointments and promotions to vacant 
positions, 
(d) conduct performance evaluations, 
(e) discipline employees, and 
(f) perform other functions appioved by the county executive, and 
agreed to by the county agency, office, or department 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-7, enacted by L. cants" and "top-ranking " deleted "from lists of 
1981, ch. 81, <* 2;1991,ch. 134, <j 3;J992*,eh. certified ehgibles" m Subsection (2)(c), and 
275, ^ 2; 1999, ch. 182, *> 4; 2001, ch. 241, made one minor stylistic change 
^ 50. The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend 2001 substituted "county executive" for "legis 
ment, effective May 3 1999, m Subsection lative body' m Subsection (2XO 
(D(cXiv) inserted "of publicly recruited apph-
17-33-8. Career service — Exempt positions. 
The career service shall be a permanent service to which this law shall apply 
and shall comprise all tenured positions m the public service now existing or 
hereafter established, except the following 
(1) The county executive members of the county legislative body, other 
elected officials, and major department heads charged directly by the 
county legislative body, or by a board appointed by the county legislative 
body, with the responsibility of assisting m the formulation and carrying 
out of matters of policy, and if it is sought that any position which differs 
from its present status be exempted or tenured after the effective date of 
this act, a public hearing on the proposed exemption or tenure shall be 
held upon due notice and the concurrence of the council 
(2) One confidential secretary for each elected county officer and major 
department head if one is assigned 
(3) An administrative assistant to the county executive, each member of 
the count}' legislative body, and to each elected official, if one is assigned 
(4) The duly appointed chief deputy of any elected county officer who 
would take over and discharge the duties of the elected county officer in 
the absence or disability of the originally responsible officer 
(5) Persons employed to make or conduct a tempoiary and special 
inquiry, investigation, or examination on behalf of the county legislative 
body or one of its committees 
(6) Noncareer employees compensated for their services on a seasonal 
or contractual basis who are hired on emergency or seasonal appointment 
basis, as approved by the council, and provisional or part-time employees 
as defined by the county's policies and piocedares or its rules and 
regulations 
(7) Positions which by their nature — confidential or key policy-
determining or both — cannot or should not be appropriately included m 
the career service All positions designated as being exempt under this 
subsection shall be listed in the rules and regulations promulgated under 
this act by job title and department, office or agency, and any change in 
exempt status shall constitute an amendment to the rules and regulations 
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History: C. 1953, 17-33-8, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 81, ^ 2; 1994, ch. 146, fc 18; 2001, 
ch. 241, i} 51. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
ment, effective April 30, 2001, added "county 
executive'1 in Subsections (1) and (3) and made 
stylistic changes 
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this 
act," and presumably also "this law," as used m 
this section, mean Laws 1981, ch 81, which 
enacted this chapter The term "effective date of 
this act," in Subsection (1), means the effective 
date of Laws 1981, ch 81, I e , July 1, 1981 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Granting of exempt status 
Relation to county policy 
Granting of exempt status. 
Only the merit council can confer exempt 
status and then only to major department 
heads charged directly by the governing body 
with assisting in policy formulation and imple-
mentation, county commissioners have no au-
thority to gi-ant exemptions from merit status 
by passing ordinances Layton v Swapp, 484 F 
Supp 958 (D Utah 1979) (decided under prior 
law) 
Relation to county policy. 
Where, under a county's personnel manual, 
the plaintiff was a permanent employee who 
could not have been discharged except for 
cause, curtailment of work, or lack of funds, 
this section did not supersede the county 
manual to make her position "exempt" rather 
than permanent, the county opted to have its 
own merit system, as delineated m its manual, 
and its restrictive discharge policy gave the 
plaintiff a property interest m continued em-
ployment that could not be curtailed without 
constitutional protections West v Grand 
County, 967 F2d 362 (10th Cir 1992) 
17-33-9. Acceptance of exempt position by career service 
employee — Reappointment register. 
(1) Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt 
position who is not retained by the appointing officer, unless discharged for 
cause as provided by this act or by regulation, shall: 
(a) be appointed to any career service position for which the employee 
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to the employee's last position in the 
career service provided an opening exists; or 
(b) be appointed to any lesser career service position for which the 
employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsec-
tion (1) of this section. 
(2) The director shall maintain a reappointment register to facilitate the 
operation of this section, which shall have precedence over other registers. 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-9, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 81, *} 2. 
Meaning of "this act." — Sep note under 
catchhnc "Meaning of 'this law"' following 
§ 17-33-5 
17-33-10. Grievance and appeals procedure — Employees* 
complaints of discriminatory or unfair employ-
ment practice, 
(1) Any county to which the provisions of this act apply shall establish in its 
personnel rules and regulations a grievance and appeals procedure. The 
procedure shall be used to resolve disputes arising from grievances as defined 
in the rules and regulations, including but not limited to acts of discrimination 
The procedure may also be used by employees in the event of dismissal, 
demotion, suspension, or transfer. 
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(2) Any charge by a'county career service employee of discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice as prohibited by Section 34A-5-106, can be filed 
with the Division of Antidiscrimination and Labor within the Labor Commis-
sion. Complaints shall be filed within 30 days of the issuance of a written 
decision of the county career service council. 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-10, enac t ed by L. crimination and Labor within the Labor 
1981, ch. 81, fr 2; 1996, ch. 240, * 3; 1997, eh. Commission" for "Division of Labor, Safety, and 
375, £ 4. Program Regulation" m Subsection (2). 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1997 amend- Mean ing of " this a c t / ' — See note under 
ment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "34A- catchhne "Meaning of 'this law'" following 
5-106" for "35A-5-106" and "Division of Ancidis- * 17-33-5 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Rights of state and municipal pub-
lic employees m grie\ ance proceedings, 46 
A.L R 4th 913 
17-33-11. Political activities of employees. 
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules and regulations promul-
gated under this chapter for federally aided programs, county emplo}Tees may 
voluntarily participate in political activity subject to the following provisions: 
(1) No person shall be denied the opportunity to become an applicant for 
a position under the merit system in any covered department by virtue of 
political opinion or affiliation. 
(2) No person employed by the county under the merit system may be 
dismissed from service as a result of political opinion or affiliation. 
(3) A county career service employee may voluntarily contribute funds 
to political groups and become a candidate for public office. 
(4) No county officer or emplo}^ee. whether elected or appointed, may 
directly or indirectly coerce, command, or advise any officer or employee 
covered under the merit system to pay, lend, or contribute part of his or her 
salary or compensation or anything else of value to any party, committee, 
organization, agency, or person for political purposes. No county officer or 
employee, whether elected or appointed, may attempt to make any officer's 
or employee's personnel status dependent upon the employee's support or 
lack of support for any political party, committee, organization, agency, or 
person engaged in a political activity. 
(5) No officer or employee may engage in any political activity during 
the hours of employment nor shall any person solicit political contribu-
tions from county employees during hours of employment for political 
purposes, but nothing in this section shall preclude voluntary contribution 
by a county employee to the party or candidate of the employee's choice. 
(6) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to permit 
partisan political activity of any county employee who is prevented or 
restricted from engaging m such political activity by the provision of the 
federal Hatch Act. 
History: C. 1953. 17-33-11, enac ted by L. F e d e r a l Law. — See note under same 
1981, ch. 81, fc 2; 1983, ch. 05, $ 1. catchhne following $ 17-33-3 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Eligibility of Public 
Officers and Employees to Serve m the State 
Legislature An Essay on Separation of Powers, 
Politics, and Constitutional Policy, 1988 Utah 
L Rev. 295(1988) 
His tory: C. 1953, 17-33-12, enac ted by L. 
1981, ch. 81, & 2. 
His tory: C. 1953, 17-33-13, enac ted by L. 
1981, ch. 81, * 2; 1998, ch. 92, $ 4. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, made stylistic 
changes to Subsections (1) to (3) to begin each 
subsection with the "It is an offense for'' lan-
guage, inserted "under circumstances not 
A.L.R. — Validity construction, and effect of 
state statutes restricting political activities of 
public officers or employees, 51 A.L.R.4th 702. 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-8-103 or 
76-8-105, to" m Subsection (2), and subdivided 
Subsection (3), adding the (a) and (b) designa 
tions 
Mean ing of " th is law." — See note under 
game catch line following § 17-33-5 
17-33-12. Reciprocal agreements for benefit of system — 
Cooperation by director with other governmen-
tal agencies. 
(1) The county may enter into reciprocal agreements, upon such terms as 
may be agreed upon, for the use of equipment, materials, facilities, and 
services with any public agency or body for purposes deemed of benefit to the 
public personnel system. 
(2) The director may cooperate with other governmental agencies charged 
with public personnel administration in conducting personnel tests, recruiting 
personnel, training personnel, establishing lists from which eligibles shall be 
certified for appointment and for the interchange of personnel and their 
benefits. 
17-33-13- Prohibited actions. 
(1) It is an offense for a person to make any false statement, certificate, 
mark, rating, or report with regard to any test, certification, or appointment 
made under any provision of this law or in any manner commit or attempt to 
commit any fraud preventing the impartial execution of this chapter. 
(2) It is an offense for a person, under circumstances not amounting to a 
violation of Section 76-8-103 or 76-8-105, to directly or indirectly, give, render, 
pay, offer, solicit, or accept any money, service, or other valuable consideration 
for any appointment, proposed appointment, promotion, or proposed promo-
tion to, or for any advantage in, a position in the career service. 
(3) It is an offense for any employee of the personnel department, examiner, 
or other person to: 
(a) defeat, deceive, or obstruct any person in his or her right to 
examination, eligibility, certification, or appointment under this chapter; 
or 
(b) furnish to any person any special or secret information for the 
purpose of affecting the rights or prospects of any person with respect to 
employment in the career service. 
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17-33-14. Violations — Misdemeanor — Ineligibility for 
employment and forfeiture of position. 
(1) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter or the 
rules and regulations promulgated under it is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) Any person who has been adjudged guilty of violating any of the 
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations promulgated under it 
shall, for a period of five years, in addition to the sanctions of Subsection (1), 
be ineligible for appointment to or employment in a position in the county 
service, and if an officer or employee of the county, shall forfeit that office or 
position. 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-14, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
1981, ch. 81, <* 2; 1991, ch. 241, t> 12. meanors, ^ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
17-33-15. Duty of county legislative body to provide rules 
or regulations — Conflicts with state or federal 
law. 
(1) It shall be the duty of the count}' legislative body to provide by rule or 
regulation for the operation and functioning of any activity within the purpose 
and spirit of the act which is necessary and expedient. 
(2) If any provision of this act or the application thereof is found to be in 
conflict with any state or federal law, conflict with which would impair funding 
otherwise receivable from the state or federal government, the conflicting part 
is hereby declared to be inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with 
respect to the department, agency, or institution of the county directly affected, 
but such finding shall not affect the operation of the remainder of this act in 
any of its applications. 
(3) Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, no rule or regulation 
shall be adopted by the county legislative body which would deprive the county 
or any of its departments, agencies, or institutions of state or federal grants or 
other forms of financial assistance. 
History: C. 1953, 17-33-15, enacted by L. act" and "this act," see note under catchlme 
1981, ch. 81, t> 3; 1993, ch. 227, * 162. "Meaning of'this law"' following § 17-33-5. 
Compiler's Notes. — For meaning of "the 
CHAPTER 34 
MUNICIPAL-TYPE SERVICES TO 
UNINCORPORATED AREAS 
Section Section 
17-34-1 Counties may provide municipal 17-34-4 Contracts under Interlocal Coop-
services — Limitation — First eration Act 
class counties required to pro- 17-34-5 Budgeting, accounting for, and 
vide paramedic and detective disbursing of funds — Annual 
audit 
1 7 17-34-6 State to indemnify county regard-
i /-d4-2 Repealed
 m g r e f u s a l i o g l t e n u c i e a r w a s t e 
investigative services 
lepeaJed 
17-34-3 Taxes or service charges — Terms and conditions 
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Tarkeshian Bnef ***page 42 
5100 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY & PROCEDURE 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
REFERENCE 
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotated 17-3 3-8 
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotated 17-33-5, 
(3) (h) 
Personnel Policy & Procedure: 
Pay Practices 
Overtime & Compensatory Practices 
Revised Ordinance Salt Lake County 1-5-12 
Revised Ordinance Salt Lake County January 17, 1980 
PURPOSE 
To define and provide uniform and consistent employment practices 
used in Salt Lake County Government. 




Part-Time Merit Employment with County Benefits 
Part-Time Merit Employment without County Benefits 
Probationary 
DEFINITIONS 
-CLERICAL OPEN RECRUITMENT REGISTER: An open recruitment register 
(definition below) which is used to fill specific clerical merit 
positions such as Office Specialist or Secretary. 
COUNTY BENEFITS: All benefits in addition to FICA, Unemployment 
Insurance, Workers Compensation and retirement. 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: The assignment of an employee to one of eleven 
employment categories, i.e. regular, merit probation, provisional, 
temporary, part-time merit employment with County benefits, part-
time merit employment without County benefits, intern, reserve 
deputies, appointed, federal man-power, and elected. 
EXEMPT EMPLOYEE: Elected members of the governing body, other 
elected officials, major department heads appointed by the 
governing body or by a board established by the governing body or 
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any other employee not covered under the merit system provisions of 
the County Personnel Management Act. Exempt employees include 
provisionals, temporaries, interns, reserve deputies, appointed 
positions, federal program employees, and elected officials. 
MERIT EMPLOYEE: An employee who has satisfactorily completed a 
merit probation period with Salt Lake County and is therefore 
entitled to all merit system benefits appropriate to hours worked. 
NEW HIRE MERIT EMPLOYEE: One who has been selected from a merit 
register. 
PAYROLL UNIT: An organization (Division, Department or Elected 
Office) or sub-unit of an organization identified by a four-digit 
organizational code. 
PROBATIONARY PERIOD: A six (6) month probationary period that must 
be satisfactorily completed by a new merit system employee, i.e. 
one who has been selected from a merit register or a rehired merit 
employee, prior to obtaining regular status. The probationary 
period may be extended for up to an additional six (6) months for 
good cause. 
FROMOTION: Change in the classification level of a merit employee 
to one having a higher entrance/starting grade level. 
REHIRE: The re-employment of a former County merit employee 
without competition. 
REINSTATEMENT: Refers to the mandatory rehire of a former County 
merit employee who (a) has been reduced-in-force within the last 
six months; or (b) is a veteran eligible under the Vietnam Era 
Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974; or (c) has been 
reinstated as a result of Career Service Council or subsequent 
court action. 
PROCEDURE 
1.0 Probationary (Status 03) 
1.1 Status as a merit employee shall be conditional upon the 
satisfactory completion of a merit probationary period. 
Merit probationary employees may be terminated at any 
time for unsatisfactory performance including 
inappropriate or unprofessional behavior. 
1.2 The merit probationary period is the first six months of 
employment following the hire date of an employee who has 
been certified from a merit employment register. 
1.2.1 Merit probation is required of: 
1.2.1.1 all new hire merit employees; 
1.2.1.2 rehired merit employees; 
1.2.1.3 employees transferring from merit exempt 
positions to merit covered positions who 
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are eligible for rehire due to previous 
merit status but who have a break in 
County service between the merit and 
exempt appointments; 
1.2.1.4 employees transferring from other merit 
systems who have not completed an 
original merit probation with Salt Lake 
County unless being transferred with an 
entire program or service; 
1.2.1.5 employees reinstated from the RIF 
retention register who do not return to 
the same classification in the same 
payroll unit from which they were 
terminated. 
1.3 The merit probationary period may be extended for up to 
an additional six months for good cause. 
1.3.1 Any extension to the merit probationary period 
shall be communicated in writing to the employee 
prior to the completion of the original probation 
period, with a copy forwarded to the Personnel 
Division. 
1.3.2 Individuals who have been placed on extended 
merit probation over three months shall be given 
performance evaluations at least every three 
months. Individuals on extended merit probations 
of three months or less, shall be given at least 
one performance evaluation near the end of the 
extended period. 
1.3.2.1 In all cases, evaluations should be given 
prior to the end of the extended merit 
probationary period. 
1.3.3 Employees who have been placed on an approved 
extended merit probationary period shall not be 
entitled to benefits which are contingent upon 
merit employment status except: 
1.3.3.1 The right to appeal to the Career Service 
Council in cases of discrimination or 
concerning undue prolongation of the 
probation period . 
1.4 Probationary employees shall be evaluated 
prior to completion of their six month merit 
probationary period. 
1.5 Prior to completion of the probationary period, the 
hiring authority shall initiate a Personnel Action Form 
(CP4), as soon as practical following the performance 
evaluation that will either terminate the employee or 
extend their merit probationary period. 
1.6 A CP4 is not required for employees who successfully 
complete the merit probation or approved extended merit 
probation period. Such employees shall be considered to 
have acquired merit status. 
1.7 Promotions - The serving of a merit probationary period 
shall not prevent a probationary employee from being 
promoted to a position of a higher classification, 
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provided the employee is certified from a merit 
employment register or is eligible for rehire into the 
position. The Administrator may allow the newly hired 
employee to serve the original probation period or begin 
a new one with the effective the date of the promotion. 
1.7.1 Probationary employees may be reclassified to a 
higher grade or salary as a result of market 
analysis. 
1.8 Termination - An employee may be terminated at any time 
during the probationary period without right of appeal, 
hearing or progressive discipline except in cases of 
alleged discrimination. Notice of dismissal and date of 
termination shall be submitted by letter to the employee. 
A copy of the letter and the CP4 must be submitted to the 
Personnel Division. 
1.8.1 A person terminated during their merit probation 
period shall not be reinstated on a merit 
employment register without competition and 
certification, unless waived by the Personnel 
Division Director. 
1.8.2 Employees in good standing who terminate or are 
terminated while on probation or extended 
probation shall be eligible for rehire into the 
same classification without competition and 
certification through the Personnel Division. 
1.8.3 Individuals who have satisfactorily completed 
merit probation or an extended merit probation 
and who terminate employment with Salt Lake 
County in good standing, are eligible for rehire 
into any County position for which they qualify 
without competition. 
2.0 Full-Time Merit Employment (Status 02) 
2.1 Full-time merit employees work an average of 40 hours per 
week. 
2.2 Full-time merit employees receive all County benefits. 
2.3 The number of hours worked per week may not be 
permanently changed without position reallocation from 
the Personnel Division and a Personnel Action Form (CP4) 
changing the status. 
2.4 Full-time merit status employees are eligible for 
reclassification, promotion and transfer. 
2.5 Full-time merit employees shall be paid on a salaried 
basis. 
2.6 Full-time merit employment follows the completion of the 
original or extended probationary period. No employee 
can be placed in a full-time merit employment status 
until they have completed an original probationary 
period. 
2.7 Individuals who have satisfactorily completed merit 
probation or an extended merit probation and who 
terminate employment with Salt Lake County in good 
standing, are eligible for rehire into any County 
position for which they qualify without competition. 
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3.0 Part-Time Merit Employment With County Benefits (Status 08) 
3.1 For record keeping purposes, the status of part-time 
merit with County benefits employees will always remain 
08 - even during the original merit probationary period. 
3.2 Part-time merit employees with County benefits shall work 
at least an average of twenty hours per week but less 
than forty. 
3.3 Part-time merit employees with County benefits receive 
most benefits pro-rated to the number of hours worked 
except that they may be required to pay a different 
percentage of costs for fixed benefits such as insurance. 
3.4 After completion of the original probationary period, 
part-time merit employees with County benefits may be 
reclassified, promoted or transferred. 
3.4.1 Part-time merit employees with County benefits 
serving a probationary period may be reclassified 
to higher grade or salary as a result of a market 
analysis. 
3.5 The number of hours worked per week may be changed at any 
time. If adjusted to less than an average of twenty 
hours per week, more than thirty hours per week, or to 
forty hours per week, during a calendar year, a status 
change shall be submitted on a* Personnel Action Form 
(CP4). 
J . 6 Part-time merit employees with County benefits shall be 
paid on an hourly basis. 
3.7 Individuals who have satisfactorily completed merit 
probation or an extended merit probation and who 
terminate employment with Salt Lake County in good 
standing, are eligible for rehire into any County 
position for which they qualify without competition. 
4.0 Part-Time Merit Employment Without County Benefits (Status 09) 
4.1 For record keeping purposes, the status of part-time 
merit employees without County benefits will always 
remain 09 - even during the original merit probationary 
period. 
4.2 Part-time merit employees without County benefits shall 
work less than an average of twenty hours per week. 
4.3 Part-time merit employees without benefits do not receive 
any County benefits. 
4.4 After completion of the original probationary period, 
part-time merit employees without County benefits may be 
reclassified, promoted or transferred. 
4.5 The number of hours worked per week may be changed at any 
time. If permanently adjusted to more than an average of 
twenty hours per week, more than thirty hours per week, 
or to forty hours per week, during a calendar year, a 
status change shall be submitted on a Personnel Action 
Form (CP4). 
4.6 Part-time merit employees without benefits shall be paid 
on an hourly basis. 
5.0 Exempt Employment Status 
5.1 For payroll purposes there are seven specific categories 
of exempt employees - 04, Provisional; 05, Temporary; 93, 
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Interns; 94 Reserve Deputy; 95, Appointed; 96 Federal 
Program (or related); 97 Elected Officials. 
Status 04 - Provisional Appointments 
5.2.1 The Personnel Division shall review and approve 
all requests for provisional appointments. 
5.2.2 A provisional appointment cannot be made until a 
position has been allocated, classified, had 
minimum qualifications established and a Request 
For Eligible Form (CP2) has been submitted to the 
Personnel Division. 
5.2.3 Administrators may request that an individual be 
considered for provisional employment if: 
5.2.3.1 there are urgent reasons for filling the 
position and the Personnel Division is 
unable to make satisfactory certification 
from a register; or 
5.2.3.2 individuals who are eligible for 
reassignment, rehire, reinstatement, 
reclassification or promotion are deemed 
inappropriate for the position. 
5.2.4 After the Personnel Division certifies that an 
individual meets the minimum qualifications of a 
position, the person may be provisionally 
appointed to fill the existing vacancy until an 
employment register is established. 
5.2.5 Provisional appointments shall not be continued 
beyond 3 0 calendar days after the establishment 
of an employment register or beyond the length of 
a probationary period, whichever comes first. 
5.2.6 The recruitment process shall proceed as quickly 
as possible. 
5.2.7 A position shall not be filled by repeated 
provisional appointments. 
5.2.8 Time spent in the position as a provisional 
employee shall be credited towards the merit 
probationary period. 
5.2.9 Provisional employees accumulate vacation and 
sick leave, receive holiday pay and are eligible 
for retirement and insurance benefits 
commensurate with the number of hours worked. 
Temporary Appointments (Status 05) 
5.3.1 A temporary appointment may not be made until a 
description of duties has been submitted to the 
Personnel Division who will assign an appropriate 
grade and pay range. If a current position 
description already exists, the grade and pay 
range previously established will be used. 
5.3.2 The hiring authority may directly hire a 
temporary employee with the exception of a 
position which is covered by the CLERICAL open 
recruitment registers. These employees shall be 
hired in the manner described in Personnel Policy 
and Procedure - Filling County Job Vacancies and 
may be transitioned to probationary status in the 
same position for which they were hired as a 
temporary. 
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5.3.3 Under no circumstances shall a temporary employee 
work more than 1,040 hours per calendar year. 
5.3.4 Temporary employees shall be paid on an hourly 
basis and within the pay range of the grade 
established by the Personnel Division for the 
position and approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
5.3.4.1 In order to pay a temporary above the 
established grade range, the 
Administrator must prepare a letter of 
justification that must be approved by 
the Board of County Commissioners through 
the Personnel Division. 
5.3.5 The time spent in a temporary appointment shall 
not be considered part of the merit probationary 
period. 
5.3.6 Temporary employees are not eligible for County 
benefits. 
5.3.7 Temporary employees are not considered merit 
employees, they are "at will" employees who may 
be terminated for any reason, without notice and 
without a pre-termination hearing. 
5.3.8 Temporary appointments are subject to the 
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. Overtime hours for all temporary employees 
are accrued at one and a half time the hours 
worked and shall be paid in cash. 
5.3.9 Overtime hours shall be counted towards the 1,040 
hours permitted in any calendar year. 
Interns (Status 93) 
5.4.1 Student interns are hired in this status. 
5.4.2 When the hiring authority wishes to hire an 
intern, they shall provide the Personnel Division 
with a letter from the college, university or 
other training institution verifying the 
individual's enrollment and the relevancy of the 
work experience to the student's education. The 
hiring authority will ensure that the intern will 
receive competent supervision from County 
employees for the period of the internship. 
5.4.3 The internship shall not be used as a means to 
replace or eliminate full-time merit employees. 
5.4.4 The appropriate stipend for each appointment 
shall be determined in consultation with the 
Personnel Division, with final approval from the 
Board of County Commissioners. 
5.4.5 Interns are not eligible for any County benefits. 
Reserve Deputy (Status 94) 
5.5.1 Reserve Deputies are hired in this status. 
5.5.2 Reserve Deputies are not eligible for any County 
benefits. 
Appointed (Status 95) 
5.6.1 Appointments made by Elected Officials to fill 
exempt Chief Deputy, Administrative Assistant to 
the County Commissioners, Confidential Secretary 
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positions, and exempt Administrators, are hired 
in this status if one is assigned by the Board of 
County Commissioners. 
5.6.2 Appointments made by Elected Officials to fill 
confidential and/or key policy-determining 
positions are also hired in this status. All 
positions designated as being exempt under this 
subparagraph shall be listed by job title and 
department, office or agency. Any change in 
exempt status shall constitute an amendment to 
this policy and procedure. 
5.6.2.1 The following positions are exempt under 
the provisions of sub paragraph 5.6.2: 
^Community Information Director - County 
Commission. 
Commission Office Assistant - County 
Commission 
*Deputy Fire Chief - Fire Division. 
*Fire Chief - Fire Division. 
*Intergovernmental Relations Manager -
Commission Staff. 
*Law Clerk Bailiff-Sheriffs Office 
^Personnel Division Director - Department 
of Community & Support Services 
5.6.3 Appointed positions receive comparable benefits 
as merit employees except as listed below. 
5.6.3.1 They do not accrue vacation and sick 
leave. 
5.6.3.2 They cannot be promoted or transferred to 
a merit position unless certified from a 
merit system register. 
5.6.3.3 They cannot be promoted or transferred to 
a merit position unless they previously 
encumbered a merit position. 
5.6.3.4 They do not receive a County preference 
adjustment when competing in merit 
registers. 
5.6.3.5 They do not have the right of appeal or 
hearing, except in cases of alleged 
discrimination. 
5.6.4 Salary ranges for exempt appointments are set by 
the Personnel Division subject to the approval of 
the Board of County Commissioners. 
5.6.5 If certified and hired for a merit position, 
individuals shall carry all benefits accrued and 
retain their original service date (adjusted for 
interrupted County service) and at the option of 
the hiring authority, may be transferred at the 
same salary - not to exceed the pay range maximum. 
5.6.6 All appointed employees who are hired into merit 
positions shall be required to serve an original 
probationary period. 
5.6.7 Merit employees who have accepted an appointment to 
an appointed position and are not retained by the 
appointing officer shall: 
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5.6.7.1 be appointed to any Career Service position 
for which they qualify in a pay grade 
comparable to their last position in Career 
Service provided an opening exists; or 
5.6.7.2 be appointed to a lesser Career Service 
position for which they qualify pending the 
opening of a position described in 5.6.6.1. 
5.6.8 Full-time merit employees who transfer to an 
appointed position and transfer back to a merit 
position, with no break in service, are not 
required to serve another merit probationary 
period. 
5.6.9 When creating an appointed position, the following 
procedure shall be followed: 
5.6.9.1 the Administrator shall make a written 
request to the Personnel Division Director 
for the change of status of a specific 
position, and shall provide the Personnel 
Division Director with a written job 
description and proposed justification of 
the change. 
5.6.9.1.1 The Personnel Division Director may 
also initiate a request concerning a 
change in the exempt or non-exempt 
status of any position within Salt 
Lake County Government. 
5.6.10 The Personnel Division Director shall review the 
request to determine if the change of status 
requirements of the County Personnel Management Act 
are met. The Personnel Division Director shall 
prepare written findings of fact and a 
recommendation which shall be forwarded to the 
Career Service Council and the requesting party. 
5.6.11 The Career Service Council shall review the 
Personnel Division Director's findings of fact and 
decision and will conduct a public hearing to rule 
on the change of status request. The Council shall 
schedule a public hearing within 10 days of receipt 
of the request to solicit input regarding the 
proposed change. Notice of the public hearing 
shall be circulated in the same manner as County 
job announcements. Such notice shall include the 
source and proposed justification of the request. 
5.6.12 The Career Service Council shall prepare written 
findings of fact and a final decision regarding the 
request for change in status which shall be 
forwarded to the governing body, the Personnel 
Division Director and the requesting Administrator. 
5.7 Federal Manpower Program or Related (Status 96) 
5.7.1 Applies to individuals hired through the Federal 
Manpower Training or similar programs. 
5.7.2 Employees may be salaried or hourly. 
5.7.3 Employees in this status are eligible for all 
County benefits except 1) the Tuition Assistance 
Program; and 2) they cannot be transferred or 
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promoted to a merit position unless they were 
certified on a merit system register by the 
Personnel Division. In lieu of the County's 
preference adjustment on merit registers, employees 
in this status, who meet the minimum 
qualifications, shall receive double credit for 
their related county experience in the program (6 
months = 12 months experience) when applying and 
competing on a merit register. 
5.7.4 If certified and hired for a merit position, 
individuals shall carry all benefits accrued and 
retain their original service date (adjusted for 
interrupted County service) and at the option of 
the hiring authority, may be transferred at the 
same salary - not to exceed the pay range maximum. 
5.8 Elected Officials (Status 97) 
5.8.1 Includes County Commissioners, Assessor, County 
Attorney, District Attorney, Auditor, Clerk, 
Recorder, Sheriff, Surveyor, and Treasurer. 
5.8.2 Salaries are set by the governing body. 
5.8.3 Elected officials receive comparable County 
benefits. 
5.8.4 Elected officials may move to a merit position only 
after successfully competing and being certified by 
the Personnel Division. 
5.8.5 If certified and hired for a merit position, 
individuals shall carry all benefits accrued and 
retain their original service date (adjusted for 
interrupted County service) and at the option of 
the hiring authority, may be transferred at the 
same salary - not to exceed the pay range maximum. 
5.8.6 Elected officials who are hired into merit 
positions shall be required to serve an original 
probationary period. 
5.8.7 Full-time merit employees who transfer to an 
Elected Office and transfer back to a merit 
position, with no break in service, are not 
required to serve another merit probationary 
period. 
5.8.8 Merit employees who are elected to office and are 
not re-elected shall: 
5.8.8.1 be appointed to any merit position for 
which they qualify in a pay grade 
comparable to their last merit position 
provided an opening exists; or 
5.8.8.2 be appointed to a lesser merit position for 
which they qualify pending the opening of a 
position described above. 
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APPROVED AND PASSED THIS 
ATTEST: 
7 L ^ A J . , ; V K /. ,r ^ , ? ^ ^ 
'Sherri Swensen 
S^ -c. Lake County Clerk 
-2 / OF &i.*0ss^tf" , 1996 
C0MM] BOARD OF COUNTY O ISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By: ^"TTUS,.,, £ 
-Brent gVercon, Chairman^^j? LJ^<?\ 
U 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
By: 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PROBATIONARY PERIOD NOTICE 
Salt Lake County has a six-month probationary period for new employees. This is a time for both you and 
your supervisor to evaluate whether there is a match between the job and your skills and interests. The 
probationary period is used for the effective adjustment of the new employee to meet acceptable work 
standards. You should discuss these standards with your supervisor. 
You should receive regular performance feedback from your supervisor during the first few months of your 
probationary period. You must receive a formal performance evaluation from your supervisor prior to 
completion of the six month probationary period. You may, however, be separated from service at any time 
for unsatisfactory performance including inappropriate or unprofessional behavior during the six-month 
probationary period for any non-discriminatory reason or no reason. Employees who are terminated will 
be notified in writing of the proposed termination and the effective date. 
Duhng this probationary period, as in all other aspects of employment with Salt Lake County, you are 
protected against discrimination on the basis of race, color, disability, national origin, age, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status or religion. If you believe such discrimination has occurred, the County grievance 
and appeal procedure is available to you. • 
I understand that my employment with Salt Lake County is probationary for six months from my 
hire date. I further understand that my performance will be monitored during the probationary period by 
my supervisor and that I will receive a formal evaluation prior to completion of the six month probationary 
period. Retention is at my supervisor's discretion, and I understand that I am not entitled to progressive 
discipline. This decision may not be appealed except on the grounds of discrimination. I understand that 
my probationary period may be extended up to an additional six (6) months. 
Please sign below to indicate you have read and understand the procedure specified above. 
PRINT NAME 
SIGNATURE DATE 
REFERENCE: Salt Lake County Personnel Policies & Procedures 
REV 06/96 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY & PROCEDURE 
ALLOCATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF MERIT POSITIONS 
REFERENCE 
County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotated, 17-33 





To establish procedures by which Salt Lake County shall monitor and 
control the classification and allocation of County merit 
positions. 
POLICY 
Upon approval from the Board of County Commissioners, the Personnel 
Division shall allocate new or additional merit positions to 
requesting agencies. No person shall be hired or appointed, and no 
merit employee shall be promoted or transferred to any position, 
until it has been approved, classified and allocated. 
PROCEDURE 
1.0 Administrators shall submit, in writing, to the Board of 
County Commissioners through Personnel, requests for 
reclassifications, new or additional allocations, to transfer 
an allocation from one payroll unit to another or to abolish 
an allocation. Upon approval, the Board of County 
Commissioners shall authorize the Personnel Division to 
allocate, transfer or abolish the allocation(s) as 
appropriate. 
1.1 The effective date for new, additional, reclassified or 
transferred allocations shall be the beginning of the 
first pay period following receipt of the agency request 
and\or the new position description in the Personnel 
Office. 
2.0 An allocation shall not be classified or reclassified unless 
the Personnel Division has received a new position description 
or has an existing position description or class specification 
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on file. 
2.1 The position description, at a minimum, shall include the 
critical or essential objectives and tasks of the 
position. The class specification should reflect the 
general types of duties and responsibilities performed by 
employees in the occupational group. 
2.2 Supervisors shall be held accountable for the accuracy of 
position descriptions and for notifying the Personnel 
Division of significant and substantive changes in duties 
and responsibilities consistent with the procedures 
described in this policy. 
2.3 Supervisors shall prepare position descriptions in the 
approved standard format and submit them to the Personnel 
Division after ensuring they are signed and approved by 
the parties identified on the position description form. 
2.4 The Personnel Division shall maintain a file of position 
descriptions or class specifications for each Agency. 
The Personnel Division shall prepare a letter to notify the 
Administrators and incumbents of the allocation change to 
include the effective date, the job code, FLSA status, title, 
grade, and full time equivalency (FTE). 
Minimum qualifications for County positions shall be seL by 
the Personnel Division. 
4.1 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet 
the new minimum qualifications as established by 
personnel, and is not required to do so by law, he or sne 
shall be grandfathered into the reclassified position. 
4.2 If the incumbent in a reclassified position does not meet 
the new minimum qualifications and is required to do so 
by law, grandfathering shall be prohibited and the 
following procedures shall apply: 
4.2.1 Probationary employees will be terminated in good 
standing. 
4.2.2 Merit employees may be transferred, reassigned, 
or promoted to another position in accordance 
with Personnel Policy and Procedure: Pay 
Practices; OR 
4.2.3 The employee may be terminated in accordance with 
Personnel Policy and Procedure: Reduction-in-
Force Separations. 
An official record of Salt Lake County allocations shall be 
maintained by the Personnel Division. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY & PROCEDURE 
ALLOCATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF MERIT POSITIONS 
APPROVED AND ADOPTED this day of ^ * 5 W7 1997. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTEST: 
SHERRIE SWENSEN, 
• Salt Lake County Clerk 
Commissioner Callaghan voted 
Commissioner Horiuchi voted 
Commissioner Overson voted 
^e*^C-£3 AS TO ?Offifi 
IA£ 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PERSONNEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE 
PAY PRACTICES 
REFERENCE 
Personnel Policy & Procedure: Filling County Job Vacancies 
General Definitions 
Utah Code Annotated, County Personnel Management Act, 17-33-5 
Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment Riches Act, 1994; 
38 U.S.C.; 4301-4333 
PURPOSE 
To identify and provide for the consistent application of pay-
adjustments resulting from the execution of a personnel policy, 
procedure, practice or action. 
THE PERSONNEL DIVISION DIRECTOR AND THE BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS WILL NOT BE BOUND BY PROMISES OR COMMITMENTS MADE TO 
EMPLOYEES OR PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES REGARDING PAY, UNLESS THE 
PROVISIONS OF THIS POLICY ARE FOLLOWED. 
PROCEDURE 
1.0 Ail salary increase requests, in excess of 10%, will be 
reviewed for approval by the Personnel Division Director and 
must be justified in writing. For those requests that exceed 
the mid-point of the salary range more extensive justification 
and prior written approval of the Personnel Division Director 
will be required. In all instances, the administrator s^hall 
pay particular attention to the impact the proposed salary 
will have on existing employees. Additional areas that must 
be addressed in any letter of justification are listed below: 
1.1 Relatedness of education and experience, including 
licenses, certifications, etc.; 
1.2 An overall evaluation of the applicants qualifications 
compared to other applicants OR to existing County 
employees within the agency or Division payroll unit; 
1.3 Market conditions - supply and demand of the labor 
market; 
1.4 Impact of not hiring, promoting or transferring this 
employee or applicant at the requested salary. 
2.0 ACTING-IN-POSITION 
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assignment. 
2.4 While Acting-in-Positicn the employee may be permanently 
promoted following applicable Salt Lake County Personnel 
Policies and Procedures. 
0 CAREER LADDER 
3.1 Salt Lake County establishes career ladders to provide 
career development opportunities for employees. 
3.1.1 A career ladder will typically consist of two or 
mere grades constituting the entry and working 
level or the entry, working and senior level. All 
levels are identified by the same title and job 
code. However, each level has distinguishing 
duties, responsibilities and characteristics. 
Advancement through the levels is dependent upon 
meeting the established career ladder advancement 
criteria. The position is classified at the 
highest level and the career development\training 
levels are established below. 
3.2 Career ladders are subject to the approval of the 
Personnel Division Director. Administrators wishing to 
develop career ladders should follow the regular position 
description review process as outlined in Salt Lake 
County Personnel Policy and Procedure, Allocation and 
Classification of Merit Positions. The Administrator 
must request that the position submitted for 
classification or reclassification be assigned to a 
career ladder. Administrators must clearly define the 
differences between each level of the career ladder 
before the structure is implemented. In addition, they 
must develop and submit written criteria for advancement 
to the next level in the career ladder. 
3.2.1 Advancement through the career ladder is 
primarily dependent upon satisfactorily 
performing the duties of and meeting the 
advancement criteria of the next higher level. 
Advancement criteria shall be applied uniformly 
to all employees in the particular career ladder. 
3.3 A merit employee who has met or exceeded the established 
advancement criteria for the career ladder plus 
demonstrated the ability to perform the duties of the 
next highest level of the career ladder must be advanced. 
3.4 A merit employee who has received a career ladder 
advancement must have his/her pay adjusted to at least 
the new pay range minimum. 
3.4.1 Pay adjustments above the pay range minimum may 
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6.1 A new hire merit employee may be hired 0% through 10%, 
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of 
Personnel Action Form (CP-4) . 
6.2 A new hire merit employee may be hired more than 10% 
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of 
Personnel Action Form (CP-4). In addition, the 
Administrator muse prepare a letter of justification that: 
must be approved by the Eoard of County Commissioners 
through the Personnel Division Director. 
7.0 PROMOTION 
7.1 All merit employees may be promoted into higher grade 
positions for which they meet the minimum education and 
experience requirements and are certified as eligible by 
the Personnel Division. 
7.1.1 Probationary employees may not be promoted unless 
they have been certified from a 
merit register developed for the higher grade 
position. These employees will be required to 
serve a new merit probationary period. 
7.2 A merit employee who has been promoted must have the pay 
adjusted to at least the new pay range minimum. 
7.2.1 Pay adjustments above the pay range minimum may 
be made as follows: 
7.2.1.1 A promotion with a pay adjustment of 0% 
through 10% may be initiated by 
completing a Notice of Personnel Action 
Form (CP-4). 
7.2.1.2 A promotion with a pay adjustment of 
more than 10% may be initiated by 
completing a Notice of Personnel Action 
Form (CP-4) . - In addition,. the 
Administrator must prepare a letter of 
justification that must be approved by 
the Board of County Commissioners 
through the Personnel Division 
Director. 
8.0 REASSIGNMENT 
8.1 An employee may be reassigned on a temporary or permanent 
basis for the purposes of improved administrative 
practices, reorganization or for any other non-
disciplinary reason. A reassignment may require a 
Personnel Action Form (C?4) if there is a change in grade 
or job code. 
8.2 An employee may be eligible for a pay adjustment due to 
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review the request for certification and 
determine the individuals eligibility for rehire 
by verifying that the individual: 
11.1.3.1 completed a County probationary period; 
11.1.3.2 left the County in good standing (was 
not terminated for cause); 
11.1.3.3 meets the current minimum job 
qualifications required for entry to 
the available position. 
11.1.4 The Personnel Division shall nocify the 
requesting Administrator of the individuals 
eligibility for rehire. 
11.1.5 If not certified as eligible for rehire by the 
Personnel Division, the Administrator shall 
inform the individual, in writing, of the 
decision. 
11.2 A former merit employee may be rehired 0% through 10%, 
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of 
Personnel Action Form (CP-4). 
11.3 A former merit employee may be rehired more than 10% 
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of 
Personnel Action Form (CP-4) . In addition, the 
Administrator must prepare a letter of justification than 
must be approved by the Board of County Commissioners 
through the Personnel Division Director. 
11.4 A rehired employee shall have his/her service, date 
adjusted to reflect all previous merit employment with 
Salt Lake County. The adjusted service date will be used 
for the purpose of determining vacation accrual, awarding 
employee service awards, employee service certificates 
and reduction-in-force retention points. 
12.0 REINSTATEMENT 
12.1 Reinstatement applies to a merit employee who (a) has 
been reduced-in-force within the last six (6) months, or 
(b) is a veteran eligible under the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Act, or (c) has been 
reinstated as a result of Career Service Council or 
subsequent court action. 
12.1.1 A merit employee who has been reinstated within 
six (6) months of being reduced-in-force must 
have his/her pay and/or benefits restored as 
follows: 
12.1.1.1 The employee will be required to serve 
a merit probation period unless the 
employee is being hired in the same 
5400 
left for military service. This 
includes all general, cost-of-living 
and length of service increases. 
12.1.2.2 The employee shall have his/her service 
date adjusted to reflect their previous 
merit employment plus a reasonable 
period between leaving county 
employment and entering military 
service, the entire pericd of military 
service and the period between release 
from the service and their return to 
work. The adjusted ser/ice date will 
be used for the purpose of determining 
vacation accrual, awarding employee 
service awards and employee service 
certificates and for the calculation of 
Reduction-in-Force retention points. 
12.1.2.3 Upon application, the employee's 
health, dental, life, etc. benefits 
will be restored without the required 
waiting period. 
12.1.2.4 The employee shall have his/her sick 
leave hours restored. 
12.1.3 A merit employee who has been reinstated as a 
result of Career Service Council or subsequent 
court action must have his/her pay and/or 
benefits restored as directed by the Career 
Service Council or court. 
12.1.3.1 When the county has been directed to 
rehire an employee who has been 
reinstated by Career Service Council or 
court action and a vacancy no longer 
exists, the Reduction-in-Force Policy 
#5720 shall be applied. 
13.0 TRANSFER (County) 
13.1 A merit employee may transfer from one payroll unit to 
another within the County subject to the approval of the 
Board of County Commissioners through the Personnel 
Division Director. When transferring between payroll 
units the following procedures apply: 
13.1.1 The new payroll unit must request that the 
Personnel Division verify that the employee meets 
the minimum qualifications of the position. 
13.1.2 The new payroll unit must contact the old payroll 
unit to arrange for a mutually agreeable transfer 
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14.2 The transferring employee may be hired 0% through 10%, 
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of 
Personnel Action Form (CP-4). 
14.3 The transferring employee may be hired more than 10% 
above the pay range minimum by completing a Notice of 
Personnel Action Form (CP-4). In addition, the 
Administrator must prepare and attach a letter of 
justification that must be approved by the Board of 
County Commissioners through the Personnel Division 
Director. 
14.4 When an individual transfers to the Salt Lake County 
merit system from another equivalent public merit system 
jurisdiction, as provided for under U.C.A. 17-33-3 and 
17-33-5(3)(b)(xii), they will be treated as a new hire 
merit employee and as such will be required to serve a 
probationary period. 
14.5 The transferring employee shall have his/her service 
date adjusted to reflect all previous merit employment 
with the other equivalent public merit system 
jurisdiction if there has been no break in service and a 
formal request is made to the Personnel Office within the 
first six (6) months of employment. 
14.6 A transferring employee may take up to thirty calendar 
days off before reporting to work with Salt Lake County 
without it being considered a break in service if the 
transfer was arranged for before the individual left his 
previous job assignment or as part of the hire 
negotiations with Salt Lake County. 
14.7 The adjusted service date will be used for the purpose of 
determining vacation accrual and awarding employee 
service awards retention points and employee service 
certificates. 
TRANSFER (Assimilation) 
When a program or service is transferred through assimilation 
to Salt Lake County government, from another public 
jurisdiction, the merit employee (s) of the original provider 
automatically become employees of the Salt Lake County merit 
system. As such, all their benefits are transferred to or 
comparable benefits are provided by Salt Lake County. All 
employees who transfer with the program or service shall have 
their service date adjusted to reflect all previous merit 
employment with the other public jurisdiction. The adjusted 
service date will be used for the purpose of determining 
vacation accrual, reduction-in-force, awarding employee 
service awards and employee service certificate. 
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Salt Lake County Public Works Department 
Administration Division 
Mary Callaghan, Commissioner 
J D Johnson, Department Director 
Larry Moller, Division Director 
March 16, 2000 
Felix McGowan 
Personnel Division Director 
2001 South State Street, N4600 
Salt Lake City Utah 84190 
Dear Felix 
SUBJECT Career Ladder Plan - Engineer 26/28/30 
DECEIVED 
MAR 2 0 2000 
SALTL' 
PERSOK 
S A L T LUKE CQUI tTY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT CENTER 
2001 S State Street 
Suite N3100 




We respectfully request approval of the Career Ladder Plan as wntten for the Engineer 26/28/30 position 
As you know, we have this classification in three Public Works divisions, Flood Control, Engineering and 
Planning/Development Services 
The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 26 to the 28 level are as follows 
1 The employee has worked for one year as a grade 26 
2 The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year as shown by 
receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory rating 
3 The employee has received their Fundamentals of Engineering (FE) certification by the 
National Council of Examiners for Engineering 
The minimum qualifications for moving an Engineer 28 to the 30 level are as follows 
1. The employee has worked for one year as a grade 28 
2 The employee has performed satisfactorily in the duties during the year as shown by 
receiving a performance evaluation with a satisfactory rating 
3 The employee has received their Professional Engineer (PE) License in the State of 
Utah 
/^RespectfyfI5\ 
D Johnson i h< v-Director Pubiic Works Department 
Sharon Hoglund 
Neil D Stack, P E Director 
Engineering Flood Control 
cc 
JDJ33 
Cal Schneller, Director 
Planning/Development Services 
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